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INTRODUCTION 
Two recent court actions have threatened to topple Congress’ 
protection of live musical performances by finding the federal anti-
bootlegging statutes1 unconstitutional.2  These opinions, issued 
three months apart from district courts in New York and 
California, the heart of America’s entertainment industry, affect 
more than the collecting habits of a few avaricious fans.3  If these 
decisions are upheld and widely followed, not only will 
bootlegging laws be outside the scope of Congress’ lawmaking 
authority, but the United States also will be incapable of enforcing 
a uniform policy that would comply with article 14 of the TRIPs 
agreement—an accord sponsored and signed into law by the 
President harmonizing American intellectual property law with the 
laws of 110 other signatory nations.4  This is an expensive 
proposition both in terms of trade sanctions that may be brought to 
bear5 and in terms of American leadership in the world of 
 
 1 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000);17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000). 
 2 United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), appeal 
docketed, No. 04-5649 (2d Cir. Oct. 26, 2004) (finding the criminal anti-bootlegging 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A, to be unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause and 
thereby dismissing indictment of defendant for bootlegging); KISS Catalog v. Passport 
Int’l Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 833 (C.D. Cal. 2004), appeal docketed, No. 04-
57077, (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 2004) (finding that the section of the civil anti-bootlegging 
statute that prohibited the unauthorized distribution of the unauthorized recording of live 
performances, 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3), was unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause). 
 3 See Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 425; KISS Catalog, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 833. 
 4 See Agreement of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 
Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 326 [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]; pertinent sections 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27–TRIPs_01_e.htm (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2005). “In respect of a fixation of their performance on a phonogram, performers 
shall have the possibility of preventing . . . [inter alia,] the fixation of their unfixed 
performance and the reproduction of such fixation.” Id., art. 14, ¶ 1.  A comprehensive 
summary of the TRIPs Agreement is available at http://www.wto.org/english-
/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#TRIPs (last visited Mar. 17, 2005). 
 5 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 42–46, 59–61 (establishing remedies of, 
inter alia, injunctions, compensatory damages and other equitable relief); see also Int’l 
Intell. Prop. Alliance, Copyright Enforcement Under the TRIPs Agreement (Oct. 19, 
2004), at http://www.iipa.com/rbi/2004_Oct19_TRIPs.pdf (listing the various 
enforcement provisions of the TRIPs Agreement). 
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intellectual property law.6  The rationale behind these decisions 
would also effectively stymie Congressional efforts to regulate in 
the area of “neighboring rights,” an increasingly vital segment of 
intellectual property law in our networked, speed-of-light world.7 
Title 18, § 2319A of the U.S. Code and 17 U.S.C. § 1101 vest 
an exclusive right to record or transmit a live performance in the 
performer(s).8  The central holdings in Martignon9 and KISS 
Catalog10 are that these rights are “copyright-like” and subject, 
therefore, to the limitations of the Copyright Clause.11 
 
 6 See Emery Simon, GATT and NAFTA Provisions on Intellectual Property, 4 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 267, 270 (1993) (discussing the options of 
the international community in responding to violations of intellectual property 
agreements, including using trade as “leverage”). 
 7 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 287–88 (2d ed. 1995) (“A term used to express the concept of rights not equal 
to copyright but which relate to or are a ‘neighbor’ of copyright. . . . ‘Neighboring rights’ 
confer a more limited level of protection than copyright.”). 
 8 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000) with 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000).  The provisions 
are identical but for the requirement in § 1101 that the act be done “knowingly and for 
purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain.”  The remedies are identical 
as well in that infringement “shall be subject to the remedies provided in sections 502 
through 505, to the same extent as an infringer of copyright.”  The United States fulfilled 
its obligation under TRIPs by enacting § 2319A (codifying § 513 of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement Act, 108 Stat. 4809, 4975 (1994)), providing for criminal penalty.  Section 
2319A reads in pertinent part: 
(a) Offense.––Whoever, without the consent of the performer or performers 
involved, knowingly and for purposes of commercial advantage or private 
financial gain–– 
(1) fixes the sounds or sounds and images of a live musical performance in 
a copy or phonorecord, or reproduces copies or phonorecords of such a 
performance from an unauthorized fixation; 
(2) transmits or otherwise communicates to the public the sounds or 
sounds and images of a live musical performance; or 
(3) distributes or offers to distribute, sells or offers to sell, rents or offers 
to rent, or traffics in any copy or phonorecord fixed as described in 
paragraph (1), regardless of whether the fixations occurred in the United 
States; 
shall be imprisoned for not more than 5 years or fined in the amount set forth in 
this title, or both, or if the offense is a second or subsequent offense, shall be 
imprisoned for not more than 10 years or fined in the amount set forth in this 
title, or both. 
 9 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 10 350 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
 11 See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176–77 (1803) (“Congress may not enact copyright-like 
DANITZ 11/21/2005  1:11 PM 
2005] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANTI-BOOTLEGGING STATUTES 1147 
 
These decisions marked a dramatic shift from the decision of 
the Eleventh Circuit five years earlier, where that court held in 
United States. v. Moghadam12 that the Commerce Clause13 could 
provide an alternative authority for the enactment of anti-
bootlegging legislation.14  In contrast, the Martignon and KISS 
Catalog courts assume that the Commerce Clause or the Necessary 
and Proper Clause could have provided Congress with the requisite 
authority, but this only would be material “if the Copyright Clause 
did not restrict Congress’ legislation in this field.”15 
This new direction in the jurisprudence, if affirmed, would 
undermine Congress’ ability to regulate the information economy, 
in a manner reminiscent of the Lochner era.16  By binding 
Congress to the four corners of the Intellectual Property Clause,17 
 
legislation, such as the anti-bootlegging statute, under the commerce clause (or any other 
clause), when the legislation conflicts with the limitation[s] imposed by the Copyright 
Clause.”)); KISS Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 833 (C.D. 
Cal. 2004) (“Since the Court cannot include a limited term of its own accord, the Court 
holds that the current version of the statute creates perpetual copyright-like protection in 
violation of the ‘for limited Times’ restriction of the Copyright Clause.”).  For more on 
jurisprudential limitations on court creation of limited copyright terms, see Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 12 United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999), reh’g en banc denied, 
193 F.3d 525 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1036 (2000). 
 13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress authority “[t]o regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States”). 
 14 See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274–82 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting 
Congress authority “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution the foregoing Powers”)). 
 15 Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 425 n.14. 
 16 Between 1897 and 1937, the Supreme Court aggressively restricted state and federal 
economic regulation in order to protect freedom of contract and property which was 
considered fundamental to individual autonomy.  “Lochnerism” is considered 
synonymous with judicial overreaching. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 8-3 to 8-4 (1988) (“[L]aws aimed at redistributing resources 
would by their very nature fall outside the legislative function.  Governmental actions 
which sought to benefit some persons at the expense of others were perceived as 
dangerous and exceptional.  If such activities were not based on notions of corrective 
justice between parties, they were merely disguised forms of robbery.”); see also Lochner 
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (requiring more than the possible existence of some 
small amount of “unhealthiness” to warrant legislative interference with a liberty right). 
 17 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  The grant of authority to Congress “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” allows 
Congress to enact both the patent and copyright systems.  “Intellectual Property Clause” 
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this interpretation of the Constitution would create a new public 
right that would displace the traditional First Amendment 
balancing of interests with a bright-line and blanket rule within the 
Constitution’s body.18  Congress would be unable to protect artistic 
or scientific expression that does not meet the requirements of a 
restrictive interpretation of the textual provisions of the Intellectual 
Property Clause.  This would strip Congress of its ability to 
respond to accelerating changes in information technology19 that 
are currently challenging the Framers’ twenty-seven word 
provision.20 
This Comment argues that in deference to Congress’ vested 
authority, before one Article I, Section 8 power is found to 
impliedly limit another, a functional and structural21 analysis is 
necessary to determine whether an actual conflict exists.  The 
Martignon and KISS Catalog opinions do not include a finding that 
the anti-bootlegging statutes actually undermine, or interfere with, 
the Copyright Clause.22  Rather, both opinions apply Railway 
 
refers to clause 8 taken as a whole.  “Copyright Clause” refers only to the copyright 
aspect of the provision. 
 18 See Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 272, 319–24 (2004). 
[I]f the constitutional interests captured by the First Amendment’s Free Speech 
Clause are a limit on Congress’s ability to grant exclusive rights, those interests 
operate through the First Amendment itself—they neither require nor suggest 
reading the Intellectual Property Clause’s limits externally . . . .  If granting 
exclusive rights does raise speech–related concerns, there is no possibility that 
Congress can avoid them by using the commerce power; the First Amendment 
itself applies to all legislation, regardless of the power under which Congress 
legislates . . . .  The very existence of the First Amendment belies any argument 
that the Intellectual Property Clause’s limits represent independently 
enforceable, speech-related constitutional norms. 
Id.; see also Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: 
The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1119, 1138 (2000). 
 19 See Heald & Sherry, supra note 18, at 1138; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 20 See id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 21 See generally WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION ch. 4, § VI (3d ed. 2003). 
 22 The Martignon court found 18 U.S.C. § 2319A to be “fundamentally inconsistent 
with Copyright Clause limitations.” See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 
428 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  The KISS Catalog court found that 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) 
“violates ‘the for limited Times’ requirement of the Copyright Clause.” See KISS Catalog 
v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 837 (C.D. Cal. 2004).  Neither opinion 
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Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons,23 in which the Supreme Court 
held that the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause 
impliedly limits Congress’ discretion to enact bankruptcy laws 
under the Commerce Clause, as a categorical and bright-line rule.24  
The analogy to Gibbons, in a context where the textual and 
structural elements that compelled its result are absent, effects a 
radical transformation of the Copyright Clause; the constitutional 
phrase “Writings” is reduced to the scope of the Copyright Act’s 
“fixation requirement” and both “Writings” and “for limited 
Times” are endowed with the same preclusive effect as the 
uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause.  The result is 
similar to building a wall in the middle of a front porch instead of a 
gate at the property-line; by erecting the “fixation requirement” as 
a barrier against copyright-like protection, the court would 
artificially restrict the Copyright Clause to the current confines of 
the Copyright Act. 
Recognizing that the Copyright Clause is broader than the 
Copyright Act, this Comment suggests that Congress’ discretion to 
enact copyright-like protections is restricted only where the 
“essential” purpose of the Copyright Clause is threatened.25  
Copyright-like statutes that, in the balance, “promote the Progress 
of Science and the useful Arts” are constitutional under either the 
Commerce Clause or the Copyright Clause itself.26  This approach 
preserves the Constitutional scheme and, at the same time, 
 
elaborates on how this inconsistency or violation undermines the Copyright Clause. See 
infra Part III. 
 23 455 U.S. 457 (1982). 
 24 The United States in its brief has also taken a categorical position.  Both the district 
courts and the government would constitutionalize the Copyright Act’s “fixation 
requirement” as a bright-line rule.  The Martignon court would limit the scope of 
copyright’s protections to fixed works: thus Congress would have no authority to 
regulate unfixed works via the Commerce Clause.  The government would limit the scope 
of copyright’s restrictions to fixed works: thus Congress would have plenary authority to 
regulate unfixed works via the Commerce Clause.  Both of these categorical approaches 
effect an artificial bifurcation of the constitutional copyright power: a result that is 
legislatively inefficient and harmful to the Constitutional scheme. See supra notes 311–
15 and accompanying text. 
 25 See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991). 
 26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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preserves Congress’ broad discretion to protect intellectual 
property.27 
Part I of this Comment presents the background leading up to 
the Martignon and KISS Catalog decisions, emphasizing the anti-
bootlegging statutes’ goals of protecting the domestic recording 
industry and implementing the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs).  This part also presents 
the controversy sparked by the enactment of the anti-bootlegging 
legislation, as well as the arguments for and against 
constitutionality.  The 1999 decision in United States v. 
Moghadam28 is also summarized in this part in some detail, 
because the recent decisions fundamentally depart from the 
Moghadam court’s reasoning. 
Part II summarizes the opinions in United States v. Martignon 
and KISS Catalog v. Passport International Productions, Inc., 
which share the common rationale that copyright-like statutes may 
not be enacted under the Commerce Clause, contrary to the 
holding in Moghadam. 
Part III analyzes this rationale and argues that this categorical 
approach has yielded a skewed result that should not be upheld at 
the appellate level.  Analogizing to the Court’s functional analysis 
in separation of powers issues, this Comment advocates for a 
functional approach to questions of the compatibility between 
copyright-like statutes and the Copyright Clause—an approach 
more in keeping with the deference due to Congress in matters of 
economic policy. 
 
 27 See Brief for the United States of America at 16, United States v. Martignon, appeal 
docketed, No. 04-5649 (2d Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Martignon Brief for the U.S.]; Brief of 
Amici Curiae UMG Recordings, Inc., EMI Music North America d/b/a Capitol Records, 
Inc., Univision Music LLC, d/b/a Univision Music Group, National Academy of 
Recording Arts & Sciences, American Federation of Musicians of the United States and 
Canada, American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, Recording Artists 
Coalition and National Music Publishers Association, Inc. In Support of Reversal, at 13, 
United States v. Martignon, appeal docketed, No. 04-5649 (2d Cir. 2005) [hereinafter 
UMG Amicus Brief]; Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Association of American Publishers; 
American Business Media; CoStar Group, Inc.; The National Association of Realtors; 
Reed Elsevier Inc.; and The Software & Information Industry Association Supporting 
Reversal, at 21, United States v. Martignon, appeal docketed, No. 04-5649 (2d Cir. 2005) 
[hereinafter Ass’n of Am. Publishers Amicus Brief]. 
 28 See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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This analysis reveals that the mere lack of “fixation” does not 
create an inherent conflict with the Copyright Clause and that the 
anti-bootlegging statutes are a form of protection which Congress 
has extended in the past within the Copyright Act itself.29  This 
Comment labels this narrow class of protections “proto-copyright” 
because the protections therein are a precursor to full copyright 
protection, encompassing original works that are poised to be fixed 
in a tangible medium of expression.  This Comment posits that this 
form of circumscribed protection is constitutional under the 
Commerce Clause and possibly under the Copyright Clause as 
well. 
In conclusion, this Comment rejects the Martignon/KISS 
Catalog rationale as overbroad; if appellate courts affirm this 
approach in a departure from Mohagdam, the United States will be 
unable to meet its obligations under TRIPS,30 the President will be 
hindered in future trade negotiations, and legislative attempts at a 
uniform intellectual property standard for the nation will be 
confounded.31 
I. THE ANTI-BOOTLEGGING STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
CONTEXT AND CONTROVERSY 
The anti-bootlegging statutes were enacted in 1994 on a fast-
track basis,32 bundled within the omnibus Uruguay Rounds 
 
 29 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are 
being transmitted, is ‘fixed’ for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being 
made simultaneously with its transmission.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52–53 
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5745 (discussing the various measures 
Congress considered or enacted regarding the Copyright Act). 
 30 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art. 14, ¶ 1 (providing in relevant part that 
TRIPs “[i]n respect of a fixation of their performance on a phonogram, performers shall 
have the possibility of preventing . . . the fixation of their unfixed performance and the 
reproduction of such fixation.”) 
 31 See infra Part I.B. 
 32 See David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1407–08 (1995) 
(“Procedurally, [the Uruguay Round Agreement Act’s] most salient feature is that it was 
implemented on a fast-track basis . . . . [B]oth the House and the Senate managed to issue 
lengthy reports on the Act.  Those reports contain virtually nothing about 
copyright . . . .”). 
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Agreement Act.33  As a consequence, 17 U.S.C. § 1101 and 18 
U.S.C. § 2319A received little attention, and Congress passed the 
legislation without debate and with essentially no legislative 
history.34  In considering the nature and purpose of the statutes, the 
courts are left, as a result, with only the text of the statutes 
themselves and the context of their adoption into federal law. 
A. Scope and Nature of the Anti-Bootlegging Statutes 
Courts define bootlegging as “the sale of wholly unauthorized 
recordings of performances by musical artists which frequently are 
produced by individuals who smuggle tape recorders into live 
performances or who record live performances broadcast over the 
radio or television.”35  The anti-bootlegging statutes protect live 
musical performances by providing legal recourse against anyone 
who records or transmits a performance without the permission of 
the performer(s).36  The statutes also protect against the 
reproduction and distribution of such unauthorized recordings.37  
The civil statute, 17 U.S.C. § 1101, provides the same remedies as 
copyright infringement, including injunction, impoundment, 
destruction, damages, and, at the discretion of the court, costs and 
attorneys fees.38  The criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A, 
penalizes commercial bootlegging activity with fines based on 
 
 33 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 
(codified in Titles 7, 15, 17–19, 21, 26, 29 and 35 of the United States Code). 
 34 See S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 225 (1994).  There is no House Report for the 
legislation. 
 35 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Recording Industry Association of America at 2, United 
States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-2180) [hereinafter RIAA 
Amicus Brief] (citing RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 852 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984)); see also Stephan Braun, Hot Acts, Hidden Microphones; Recordable CDs Give 
Concert Pirates a Bootleg Up.  Industry Wants Laws Fine-Tuned, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 
1999, at A1 (“Music bootlegging—the unsanctioned taping and distribution of rare, 
unreleased recordings and concert material—is a hobby gone haywire, part black market, 
part crusade.  It is an outlaw trade of hustlers who cater to the voracious appetites of 
music buffs who can never get enough, fans who scheme and pay whatever it takes to 
obtain souvenirs of the performances of their idols.”). 
 36 See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000); 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000); supra note 8 (providing 
relevant statutory text and analysis). 
 37 See id. 
 38 See 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000) (establishing liability under 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–05 
(2000)). 
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victim impact statements and/or up to five or ten years 
imprisonment for first or second offenses respectively.39  The 
statute also mandates forfeiture and destruction of the recordings 
and, at the discretion of the court, of the recording equipment.40 
B. Policies of the Anti-Bootlegging Statutes 
The anti-bootlegging statutes are the product of a two-pronged 
legislative initiative thirty years in the making.41  The statutes 
protect the domestic music industry from the depredations of 
bootleggers and, concurrently, align American standards of 
protection with international trading partners.42 
1. Domestic Protection 
The anti-bootlegging statutes are an outgrowth of Congress’ 
ongoing efforts to protect the interests of the American recording 
industry.43  Copyright protection was first extended to 
phonorecords44 in the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971.45  
That amendment was enacted in response to the “widespread 
unauthorized reproduction of phonograph records and tapes” 
amounting to approximately 25% of the value of annual record and 
tape sales.46  The Copyright Act of 1976 incorporated these 
 
 39 See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (2000). 
 40 See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(b) (2000). 
 41 See infra notes 43–61 and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra notes 72–99 and accompanying text. 
 43 See H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 2 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1567. 
 44 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
“Phonorecords” are material objects in which sounds, other than those 
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any 
method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the 
aid of a machine or device.  The term “phonorecords” includes the material 
object in which the sounds are first fixed. 
Id. 
 45 Sound Recording Amendment Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971). 
 46 H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 2 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1567.  The 
report estimated annual piracy amounted to 100 million 1971 dollars where the gross 
value of 1971 legitimate record sales was $400 million.  Other reasons set forth for this 
legislation were denial of artists’ royalties and loss of federal and state tax revenues. 
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protections47 and Congress subsequently expanded protection of 
sound recordings in the Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments 
Act of 1982,48 the Record Rental Amendment of 1984,49 and the 
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995.50 
While these statutes protected record companies and artists 
from “piracy” of existing recordings,51 they did not protect live 
performances from bootlegging activity.52  Prior to 1985, some 
Circuits had applied53 the National Stolen Property Act,54 which 
imposed criminal penalties for interstate transportation of stolen 
property, to interstate trafficking in “bootleg records.”55  However, 
the Supreme Court, in Dowling v. United States,56 held that that 
statute did not apply to bootleg recordings because such items 
“were not ‘stolen, converted or taken by fraud’ except in the sense 
that they were manufactured and distributed without the consent of 
the copyright owners” of the underlying musical works.57  
Performers and producers were left with only a patchwork of state 
 
 47 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541; see 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–14 
(2000 & Supp. 2002). 
 48 Pub. L. No. 97-180 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2318–19 (2000)) 
(imposing criminal and civil liability for trafficking in counterfeit phonorecord labels). 
 49 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (2000) (prohibiting rental of phonorecords to the public for 
commercial gain). 
 50 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 
109 Stat. 336 (1995) (granting performance rights in digital transmissions of sound 
recordings). 
 51 See supra notes 45–50; see also Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Issues: Anti-Piracy, 
at http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy (last visited Mar. 15, 2005) (defining four 
categories of music piracy). 
 52 See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08[C][2] 
(2004). 
 53 E.g., United States v. Dowling, 739 F.2d 1445, 1448 (9th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter 
Dowling I], rev’d, 473 U.S. 207 (1985) [hereinafter Dowling II]. 
 54 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2000) replaced 18 U.S.C. § 413, which was the National Stolen 
Property Act.  The history of the statute indicates that it is no longer being called this 
name (“Section consolidates §§ 413, 415, 417, 418, 418a, and 419 of title 18, U.S.C., 
1940 ed. . . . Section 413 of title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., providing the short title ‘National 
Stolen Property Act,’ was omitted as not appropriate in a revision.”). 
 55 Dowling I, 739 F.2d 1445. 
 56 Dowling II, 473 U.S. at 213. 
 57 Id. at 208; see also id. at 228–29 (“[T]he rationale employed [by lower courts] to 
apply the [mail fraud and interstate transportation of stolen goods] statute to petitioner’s 
[copyright-related] conduct would support its extension to significant bodies of law that 
Congress gave no indication it intended to touch.”). 
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statutory and common law causes of action.58  These remedies 
were rarely utilized as they could not address the interstate and, 
increasingly, international scope of bootlegging activity.59  Thus, 
no uniform protection of live performances was possible until the 
anti-bootlegging statutes were enacted.60  Title 18, § 2319A of the 
U.S. Code and 17 U.S.C. § 1101 filled a gaping hole in the federal 
scheme to protect the domestic recording industry.61 
2. International Harmonization 
The domestic protection of the American recording industry 
paralleled the United States’ increasing prominence as a net 
exporter of intellectual property.62  International trade had always 
exerted an influence on United States intellectual property policy.63  
 
 58 See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 2.02 (discussing the states’ role 
in protecting copyrighted works not fixed in a tangible medium via common law because 
federal preemption of the Copyright Act does not apply to such works). 
 59 See RIAA AMICUS BRIEF, supra note 35, at 12 (“Rare is the performer with a public 
following only within a single state who is nevertheless popular enough to be a target of 
bootleggers.  Bootleggers ordinarily target nationally and internationally known 
performers and for self-evident economic reasons are unlikely to restrict their unlawful 
distributions to a single state.”). 
 60 See id. at 6 (“Given the immense profitability of bootlegging due to recent 
technological advancements and corresponding incentives for bootleggers, the growing 
worldwide scope of bootlegging, and the insufficiency of previous efforts to deal with the 
problem, Congressional enactment of Section 2319A was the right remedy at the right 
time.  Without the deterrence of Section 2319A, bootleggers could continue their 
depredations without fear of a tough, nationwide response coordinated by the federal 
government.”). 
 61 Id. 
 62 See Intellectual Property Crimes, at 
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/fc/fifu/about/about_ipc.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2005) 
(“Currently, the U.S. leads the world in the creation and export of IP and IP-related 
products.  The International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition recently reported that the 
combined U.S. copyright industries and derivative businesses account for more than $433 
billion, or 5.68%, of the U.S. Gross National Product, which is more than any other 
single manufacturing sector.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that between 1977 
and 1996 the growth in the IP segment of the economy was nearly twice that of the U.S. 
economy as a whole.”). 
 63 See, e.g., International Copyright Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1106, § 13; Louisiana 
Purchase Exposition Act of 1904, 33 Stat. 4, § 7; Ad Interim Act of 1905, 33 Stat. 1000, 
§ 4952; Buenos Aires Convention of 1914, http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa-
/copyrights/The%20Buenos%20Aires%20Convention.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2005); 
The Universal Copyright Convention of 1952, available at http://ipmall.info-
/hosted_resources/lipa/copyrights/Protocol%203%20Annexed%20to%20the%20Universa
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However, it was not until the 1980s that the United States 
implemented an aggressive policy of harmonization64 with 
international standards of protection.65  Facing an appalling trade 
deficit and rampant piracy of American products abroad, the 
United States reversed one hundred years of reticence and adhered 
to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works66 on March 1, 1989.67  Although the Berne Convention 
itself granted protection to unfixed works,68 it did not require 
member nations to extend such protection,69 and the United States 
joined the Convention without providing protection to unfixed 
works.70 
The policy of harmonization reached a high water mark in 
1994 with the implementation of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS),71 within the Uruguay 
 
l%20Copyright%20Convention.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2005). See generally WILLIAM 
F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (2000), http://digital-law-online.info/patry/ 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2005). 
 64 See generally ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS § 2.3 (2003). 
 65 See, e.g., Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals 
Transmitted by Satellite, May 21, 1974 (ratified Dec. 7, 1984), 13 I.L.M. 1444, available 
at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/brussels/pdf/trtdocs_wo025.pdf; General System of 
Preferences Renewal Act, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948, 3018 (1984); International 
Trade and Investment Act, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948, 3000 (1984); Berne 
Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988); Visual 
Artists Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128 (1990); 17 U.S.C. § 
102(a)(8) (2000) (Berne adherence legislation) (amending 17 U.S.C. §102 (2000) to 
include architectural works within the scope of copyrightable subject matter); North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 
334, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (creating 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2000) which provides for certain 
copyright protection in motion pictures), 107 Stat. 2057 (1993). See generally PATRY, 
supra note 63. 
 66 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 
1886, revised July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention], available 
at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html. 
 67 See Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 
(1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Berne 
Convention Implementation Act]. 
 68 See Berne Convention, supra note 66, art. 2, ¶ 1. 
 69 See id. art. 2, ¶ 2. 
 70 See Berne Convention Implementation Act, supra note 67. 
 71 See supra note 4. 
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Round of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT).72  
TRIPs incorporated many of the pre-existing international 
intellectual property agreements, including the Berne 
Convention,73 the Paris Convention,74 the Washington Treaty on 
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits,75 and the 
Rome Convention for performances and neighboring rights.76  
TRIPs gave effect to the Rome Convention77 by requiring 
protection of performers from the unauthorized recording or 
broadcasting of their live performances.78  In compliance with this 
obligation,79 Congress enacted the civil80 and criminal81 anti-
 
 72 See Understanding the WTO: Basics—The GATT Years: From Havana to 
Marrakesh, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2005); Understanding the WTO: Basics—The Uruguay Round, at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 
2005); Uruguay Round Agreement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809. 
The Uruguay Round Agreements are the broadest, most comprehensive trade 
agreements in history and were negotiated by 125 countries.  They are vital to 
our national interest and to economic growth, job creation, and an improved 
standard of living for all Americans.  These agreements, by lowering tariff and 
other barriers to international trade and investment, will lead to increased levels 
of world and U.S. output, trade, real income, savings, investment, and 
consumption . . . . When fully implemented, these agreements are expected to 
increase U.S. GNP by $100–$200 billion per year.  They are also expected to 
create hundreds of thousands of new, permanent well-paying American jobs 
(over and above the normal growth in employment in the economy). 
H.R. REP. NO. 103-826(I), at 16 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773. 
 73 See Berne Convention, supra note 66. 
 74 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, revised 
July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention], available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html. 
 75 See Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, May 26, 1989, 
28 I.L.M. 1477, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/washington/pdf-
/trtdocs_wo011.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2005). 
 76 See WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 6, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt-
/trtdocs_wo034.html#P109_12974. 
 77 See id. art. 10. 
 78 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, art. 14, ¶ 1 (“In respect of a fixation of their 
performance on a phonogram, performers shall have the possibility of preventing the 
following acts when undertaken without their authorization: the fixation of their unfixed 
performance and the reproduction of such fixation.  Performers shall also have the 
possibility of preventing the following acts when undertaken without their authorization: 
the broadcasting by wireless means and the communication to the public of their live 
performance.”). 
 79 See S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 2–3 (1994). 
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bootlegging statutes protecting performers against the unauthorized 
recording, transmission to the public, and the sale or distribution 
of, or traffic in, unauthorized recordings of their live musical 
performances.82 
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, signed into law by 
President Clinton on December 8, 1994, was the product of eight 
years of negotiations amongst 123 nations.83  The United States 
strongly advocated for TRIPs, and this placed the United States in 
the center stage of “the highest expression to date of binding 
intellectual property law in the international arena.”84  Unlike the 
prior great conventions, TRIPs included enforcement requirements 
and noncompliance with agreed provisions could trigger trade 
sanctions tied to the larger GATT agreement.85  Thus the anti-
bootlegging statutes have ongoing significance to the nation’s 
global trade policies.86 
C. Constitutional Basis for the Anti-Bootlegging Statutes 
The anti-bootlegging statutes immediately raised questions of 
Constitutional dimension that the scarce legislative history could 
not answer.87  Many commentators viewed federal protection of 
live performances as an erosion of the traditional boundary 
 
 80 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000). 
 81 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000). 
 82 See supra note 8. 
 83 The Uruguay Round of GATT began in September 1982 and was signed by the 
participating ministers on April 15, 1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco.  This officially ended 
GATT and began WTO. See Understanding the WTO: Basics—The Uruguay Round, at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 
2005). 
 84 See Nimmer, supra note 32, at 1391–92. 
 85 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 4, arts. 42–46, 59–61; Int’l Intell. Prop. Alliance, 
Copyright Enforcement Under the TRIPs Agreement (Oct. 19, 2004), at 
http://www.iipa.com/rbi/2004_Oct19_TRIPS.pdf; Emery Simon, GATT and NAFTA 
Provisions on Intellectual Property, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 267, 
270 (1993). 
 86 See supra note 72. 
 87 See Nimmer, supra note 32, at 1408–09 (“One seeks in vain for evidence that anyone 
in Washington even considered the constitutional basis for these vitally important [anti-
bootlegging] amendments to the copyright law.”). 
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between copyright and the public domain.88  David Nimmer hailed 
“the end of copyright,” suggesting that copyright, empowered by 
the Commerce Clause, now served the “new master” of 
international trade.89  These commentators view the anti-
bootlegging statutes as a juggernaut threatening centuries of 
carefully crafted Constitutional limits.90  The developing split 
among the Circuits91 attests to the complex balancing of state, 
federal, legislative, and judicial interests enmeshed in the question 
of the implied and express limits on Congressional authority to 
reshape the contours of copyright.  This Comment suggests that the 
anti-bootlegging statutes do not run afoul of these limits which 
have already been clearly and fully set down by the Supreme 
Court.92 
The Intellectual Property Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 
of the U.S. Constitution, grants Congress the authority “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”  Two centuries of Supreme 
Court decisions93 and consistent Congressional practice94 had 
 
 88 See, e.g., Peter A. Jaszi, Goodbye to All That––A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) 
Adieu to a Constitutionally-Grounded Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 595, 602–05 (1996) (“Most students of copyright would concur, 
at some level, that the limited times language expresses more than an incidental or 
technical constraint on federal grants of intellectual property protection, at least where 
copyrightable subject matter is concerned.”). 
 89 See Nimmer, supra note 32, at 1412 (“Copyright, it seems, now has a new 
master . . . .  [C]opyright now serves as an adjunct of trade . . . .”). 
 90 See id. at 1416. 
 91 See supra notes 10–12. 
 92 See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991); see also Bonito 
Boats v. Thundercraft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1988). 
 93 See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); Goldstein v. 
California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (interpreting “Writings” as “any physical rendering 
of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor”) (citing The Trade-Mark Cases, 
100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)); cf. CBS v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 
389 U.S. 1007 (1967) (“[W]hile more precise limitations on “writings” might be 
convenient in connection with a statutory scheme of registration and notice, we see no 
reason why Congress’ power is so limited.”). 
 94 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with 
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression. . . .”).  Although the fixation requirement was first made explicit in the 
Copyright Act of 1976, prior law required publication with notice or registration with the 
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seemingly embedded a “fixation requirement” into the meaning of 
“Writings.”95  Since live performances are inherently “unfixed” the 
anti-bootlegging statutes seemed to contravene that requirement.96 
The Clause also states, in plain terms, that exclusive rights may 
be granted to authors only “for limited Times,”97  a limitation also 
consistently enforced within the Copyright Act.98  “A federal 
copyright statute that purported to grant copyright protection in 
perpetuity would clearly be unconstitutional.”99  If the anti-
bootlegging statutes failed to meet these copyright requirements, 
the question remained whether the Commerce Clause could 
provide an alternative authority for their enactment as “copyright-
like” statutes.100 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution grants 
Congress authority to regulate activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce,101 even if those activities themselves are 
entirely intrastate in nature.102  The anti-bootlegging statutes, 
enacted to protect “the $12 billion recording industry,”103 and 
pursuant to international trade agreements, satisfied the Commerce 
Clause threshold requirements.104  However, commentators 
disagreed as to the effect of the Intellectual Property Clause’s 
words of limitation upon other Article 1, Section 8 powers.105  
 
Copyright Office, necessitating a fixed form. See Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule 
of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 721 (2003). 
 95 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 1.08[C][2]. 
 96 See id. 
 97 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 98 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 1.05[A][1]. 
 99 Id. 
 100 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3  (Congress has the legislative authority “[t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.”). 
 101 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995). 
 102 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942). 
 103 See RIAA Amicus Brief, supra note 36, at 3 (stating that “[t]he recording industry is 
a major sector of the U.S. economy, with 1997 sales exceeding $12 billion”). 
 104 See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 105 See Nimmer, supra note 32, at 1409 (“[N]o respectable interpretation of the word 
‘Writings’ embraces an untaped performance of someone singing at Carnegie Hall.”); see 
also Susan M. Deas, Jazzing up the Copyright Act?  Resolving the Uncertainties of the 
United States Anti-Bootlegging Law, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 567, 570 (1998) 
(“The most obvious constitutional departure . . . is how [the anti-bootlegging statutes] 
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Some espoused a broad “structuralist” approach to constitutional 
interpretation that proscribed the use of the Commerce Clause to 
make “end runs” around the express limitations of the Copyright 
Clause.106  Others viewed the Intellectual Property Clause as an 
independent grant of Congressional authority.107 
1. Traditional View of the Intellectual Property Clause 
Traditionally, the Copyright Clause has been viewed as an 
entirely positive grant of power to Congress.108  The copyright 
power permits Congress to vest authors with the right to exclude 
others from unauthorized reproduction, distribution, performance, 
display, and adaptation of their work.109  This grant traditionally 
 
extend[] protection to unfixed material under the authority of a congressional 
enactment.”). 
 106 See Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The 
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1119, 1177 (arguing that the history and structure of the Intellectual Property Clause 
militates against Congressional authority to enact certain legislation); Jaszi, supra note 
88, at 602–05; Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the 
Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 63–64 (2000) (“To allow 
Congress to do things under its general commerce power that it is forbidden to do under 
its specifically applicable copyright and patent power would in essence read the 
Copyright and Patent Clause out of the Constitution.”); William Patry, The Enumerated 
Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 394–97 (1999); Andrew M. Hetherington, Comment, 
Constitutional Purpose and Inter-Clause Conflict: The Constraints Imposed on Congress 
by the Copyright Clause, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 457, 503–06 (2003) 
(arguing that an impermissible conflict is created whenever Congress acts under any 
constitutional provision in a manner that frustrates an explicit constitutional purpose set 
out in a different provision); Joseph C. Merschman, Comment, Anchoring Copyright 
Laws in the Copyright Clause: Halting the Commerce Clause End Run Around Limits on 
Congress’s Copyright Power, 34 CONN. L. REV. 661, 677 (2002). 
 107 See Nachbar, supra note 18 (positing that an accurate evaluation of the Intellectual 
Property Clause’s place in the Constitution requires a new approach that recognizes that 
not all of the limits of Article I powers are of equal constitutional weight and that 
considers the constitutional significance of the restrictions in question); see also Shira 
Perlmutter, Participation in the International Copyright System as a Means to Promote 
the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 324 n.5 (2002) (“The 
text of the preambular phrase in the Copyright Clause does not limit the desired ‘progress 
of science’ to ‘incentives for creation.’  Thus, even assuming the phrase operates as a 
substantive constraint on congressional power, it does not prevent Congress from 
considering the entire range of possible means by which progress may be promoted.”). 
 108 Hetherington, supra note 106, at 484–85. 
 109 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000 & Supp. 2002). 
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has been construed as an incentives scheme.110  Without exclusive 
rights, free-riders would sell works at unreasonably low prices that 
do not reflect the time and effort invested in their production.111  
This would drive authors from the market.112  Congress’ copyright 
power avoids this loss of intellectual potential by authorizing 
Congress “to promote the progress of science and the useful arts” 
by granting a limited monopoly.113  Therefore, copyright is an 
economic policy affecting private business interests and does not 
implicate larger constitutional concerns that would affect 
Congress’ ability to act under another Section 8 power.114  
Proponents of Congress’ authority to enlarge the scope of these 
incentives beyond the limits of the Copyright Clause point to cases 
where Congress has enacted legislation under one Constitutional 
power to achieve an end proscribed under another.115 
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,116 the Supreme 
Court held that the Commerce Clause justified the public 
accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,117 
even though similar provisions proscribing private discrimination 
within the Civil Rights Act of 1875118 had been declared beyond 
the scope of Congress’ authority under § 5119 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.120  This illustrates the general proposition that 
Congress’ various grants of authority, in this case the 14th 
 
 110 See generally SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 64, § 1.3.1. 
 111 See Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 
1204 (1996). 
 112 Id. (At a price derived from a copyright–free world “the author would realize no 
financial return on his investment in creating the work.  In this world, only authors 
unconcerned with financial return would produce creative works.”) (citing William M. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 325, 328 (1989)). 
 113 Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 114 See Nachbar, supra note 18, at 291. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964). 
 117 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
 118 43 Cong. Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875). 
 119 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (providing that “[t]he Congress shall have power to 
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment]”). 
 120 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (holding that “the act[s] of 
[C]ongress of March 1, 1875, entitled ‘An act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal 
rights,’ are unconstitutional and void . . .”). 
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Amendment and the Commerce Clause, may operate 
independently and in the alternative to one another.121 
In The Trademark Cases, the Supreme Court held that the 
Copyright Clause could not sustain the 1876 Trademark Act 
because a trademark “is simply founded on priority of 
appropriation” and not on originality in authorship.122  Although 
that Court found that the Act was not justified by the Commerce 
Clause either, under the modern concept of the Commerce 
Clause,123 the Act would have been upheld.  The constitutionality 
of modern federal trademark laws124 therefore attests to Congress’ 
ability to enact intellectual property laws that are beyond the scope 
of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 by using its Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 3 authority.125 
The principle that, generally, Congress’ enumerated powers are 
nonexclusive is also supported by Authors League of America, Inc. 
v. Oman,126 in which the Second Circuit held that a statute 
withholding copyright protection for imported publications127 and 
 
 121 See, e.g., Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
 122 The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). 
 123 The 1870 Act did not have a jurisdictional component that would limit its scope to 
interstate commerce.  The modern view of the Commerce Clause permits intrastate 
regulation of matters that “substantially affect” interstate commerce, such as trademarks. 
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123–24 (1942). 
 124 Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15, 17, and 28 U.S.C.). 
 125 In The Trade-Mark Cases and Heart of Atlanta, the Court did not explicitly address 
the question of whether Congress may enact legislation under the Commerce Clause that 
is precluded from enactment under Constitutional provision. See, e.g., Maya Pollack, 
Unconstitutional Incontestability?  The Intersection of the Intellectual Property and 
Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar 
Corp., 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 259, 297–98 (1995) (noting that the Court did allude to 
Congressional power to enact legislation outside of the Intellectual Property Clause). 
 126 Authors League of Am., Inc. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1986) (Oakes, J., 
concurring). 
 127 See 17 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2000).  The “manufacturing clause” protected domestic 
printers by restricting the ability of foreign printers to receive copyright protection for 
books shipped to the United States: 
[T]he importation into or public distribution in the United States of copies of a 
work consisting preponderantly of nondramatic literary material that is in the 
English language and is protected under this title is prohibited unless the 
portions consisting of such material have been manufactured in the United 
States or Canada. 
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codified within the Copyright Act, could not be sustained under the 
Copyright Clause because the statute did not “promote the 
Progress of . . . useful Arts.”128  Instead, the Authors League court 
found that the statute was a legitimate exercise of its Commerce 
Clause power to regulate commerce with foreign nations.129 
Under this traditional view, the express and implied limitations 
of the Intellectual Property Clause—namely the requirements that 
the work be a “Writing,” that protection be extended only for 
“limited Times,” and that the progress of Science and the useful 
Arts be promoted—apply only when Congress is legislating under 
that power, and should not hinder Congress’ ability to enact 
copyright-like legislation under the Commerce Clause.130 
2. Structuralist Views of the Intellectual Property Clause 
A pattern of recent holdings has signaled to many observers 
that the Rehnquist Court has rejected the view that each of 
Congress’ enumerated powers is “hermetically sealed . . . such that 
Congress may ignore the restrictions on its power contained in one 
clause merely by legislating under another clause.”131  Instead, the 
Court seems to have adopted a structural approach to defining the 
scope of Congress’ enumerated powers.132   
In United States v. Lopez, the Court put an end to fifty years of 
judicial deference to Congress’ own conception of its Commerce 
Clause authority.133  Striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act 
 
 128 Authors League, 790 F.2d at 223–24. 
 129 Id. (“In our view, denial of copyright protection to certain foreign-manufactured 
works is clearly justified as an exercise of the legislature’s power to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations.”). However, the Second Circuit did not determine that the 
challenged statute had actually violated an express limit of the Copyright Clause. Id. 
 130 See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1277 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[E]ach of 
the powers of Congress is alternative to all of the other powers, and what cannot be done 
under one of them may very well be doable under another.”); see also Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
 131 Patry, supra note 106, at 371 (1999); see also supra note 106. 
 132 See generally MURPHY ET AL., supra note 21, ch. IV, § VI. 
 133 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995) (“[S]ome of our prior cases 
have taken long steps down that road, giving great deference to congressional action . . . . 
The broad language in these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional 
expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further.  To do so would require us to 
conclude that the Constitution’s enumeration of powers does not presuppose something 
DANITZ 11/21/2005  1:11 PM 
2005] CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANTI-BOOTLEGGING STATUTES 1165 
 
of 1990, the Court held “that [the commerce] power is subject to 
outer limits” and that Congress could not use its authority to 
regulate commerce in a way that “would effectually obliterate the 
distinction between what is national and what is local . . . .”134  In 
United States v. Morrison, the Court reiterated this limiting view of 
the Commerce Clause, holding that Congress had exceeded its 
commerce power in granting a private right of action to redress 
gender-motivated violence.135  In these and other decisions such as 
Printz v. United States,136 City of Boerne v. Flores,137 and Clinton 
v. New York,138  the Court has shown a readiness to invalidate 
legislation that exceeds the defined and limited powers of the 
federal government.139 
In Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons,140 the Court 
struck down a Commerce Clause statute that conflicted with the 
Bankruptcy Clause, another Article I, Section 8 power of 
Congress.141  The Rock Island Transition and Employee Assistance 
Act (RITA) provided former employees of the bankrupt Chicago, 
Rock Island, and Pacific Railroad Company with unemployment 
benefits valued at seventy-five million dollars.142  These funds 
were to be distributed from the company’s bankruptcy estate with 
priority over the claims of unsecured creditors.143  The Court found 
the statute directly conflicted with the uniformity requirement of 
 
not enumerated, . . . and that there never will be a distinction between what is truly 
national and what is truly local . . . . This we are unwilling to do.”). 
 134 Id. at 557. 
 135 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601–02 (2000) (holding the Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994 (“VAWA”) unconstitutional for lack of Congressional 
authority either under the Commerce Clause or the enactment provision of the Fourteenth 
Amendment).  This holding, as well as the holding in Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, is compelled 
by the implied limits of federalism, while others have enforced the structural implications 
of the separation of powers. See generally MURPHY ET AL., supra note 21, at 548–56. 
 136 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down provisions of the Brady Handgun Bill). 
 137 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). 
 138 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (striking down the Line Item Veto Act). 
 139 See supra notes 133–38; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) 
(“The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited . . . .”). 
 140 455 U.S. 457 (1982). 
 141 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 142 Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 462. 
 143 Id. at 463. 
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the Bankruptcy Clause.144  Justice Rehnquist expressed the view of 
the Court that a specific limitation on one of Congress’ enumerated 
powers145 may, under some circumstances, restrict Congress’ 
ability to legislate under an alternative power:146 
Unlike the Commerce Clause, the Bankruptcy Clause itself 
contains an affirmative limitation or restriction upon 
Congress’ power: bankruptcy laws must be uniform 
throughout the United States . . . . Thus, if we were to hold 
that Congress had the power to enact nonuniform 
bankruptcy laws pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we 
would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the 
power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.147 
Like the Bankruptcy Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause 
incorporates specific terms of limitation.148  Therefore, if Gibbons 
applies as a general rule by preventing Congress from avoiding 
other Article I, Section 8 limitations by invoking other, broader 
clauses, then Congress is proscribed from enacting copyright-like 
laws under the Commerce Clause.149 
a) William Patry’s “Negative Right” 
William Patry posits that “[u]nder the Court’s structural 
approach, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 contains both positive and 
negative rights: a positive right to grant authors a limited 
monopoly in their original material, and a negative right in the 
public to copy unoriginal material.”150  Professor Patry and other 
 
 144 Id. at 468–69. 
 145 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (containing 17 clauses enumerating Congress legislative 
powers). 
 146 Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 468–69. 
 147 Id. 
 148 See Pollack, supra note 125, at 320 (“Under certain circumstances, other 
Constitutional provisions may act as limits upon the Commerce Clause.  These include 
the Bankruptcy Clause, and the Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Twenty-first Amendments.  
These various provisions have kept Congress from utilizing the Commerce Clause as a 
means to avoid the provisions’ requirements.”). 
 149 See supra notes 148–55. 
 150 Patry, supra note 106, at 362. 
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commentators maintain that Bonito Boats v. Thundercraft Boats151 
and Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service,152 two 
unanimous decisions authored by Justice O’Connor, have imported 
the Court’s structural approach into the heart of the Intellectual 
Property Clause.153  Taken together, these decisions establish a 
constitutional floor to Clause 8, holding that the means by which 
the progress of science and the useful arts is promoted is by 
making the “building blocks” of creativity, facts and ideas, 
available to the public.154  Public access to uncopyrightable and 
unpatentable subject matter, as well as access to copyrightable and 
patentable subject matter after the period of protection expires, is 
therefore the benefit of the bargain contemplated in the 
Constitution: limited monopoly rights in original works in 
exchange for public access to the ideas and facts they embody..155  
The scope of this “negative right,” and whether it acts as an 
absolute bar to legislation of copyright-like statutes under the 
Commerce Clause, is the subject of vigorous debate and the nub of 
the issue in controversy in Moghadam,156 Martignon,157 and KISS 
Catalog.158 
b) Thomas Nachbar’s “Constitutional Norms” 
Thomas Nachbar’s structural approach to the enumerated 
powers of Congress suggests that the Intellectual Property Clause 
should operate independently of other clauses.159  Professor 
 
 151 489 U.S. 141 (1988) (“[T]he Clause contains both a grant of power and certain 
limitations upon the exercise of that power.  Congress may not create patent monopolies 
of unlimited duration, nor may it ‘authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to 
remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials 
already available.’”) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)). 
 152 499 U.S. 340 (1991).  In Feist, the Court, reaching the constitutional issue sua 
sponte, stated plainly that originality is “a constitutional requirement” and the essence of 
copyright. Id. at 346. 
 153 See Patry, supra note 106, at 367. 
 154 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 350 (“[T]he raw facts may be copied at will.  This result is 
neither unfair nor unfortunate.  It is the means by which copyright advances the progress 
of science and art.”). 
 155 Id. 
 156 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 157 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 158 350 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
 159 See generally Nachbar, supra note 18. 
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Nachbar suggests that “whether a specific restriction on a specific 
Article I power must be read externally depends on whether it 
reflects an enforceable constitutional norm.”160  A “constitutional 
norm” inheres in the fabric of the Constitution.161  Certain norms, 
when present, tend to narrow the scope of Congress’ enumerated 
powers and broaden the effect of its limitation upon other 
enumerated powers.162  These “narrowing norms” include 
federalism, the separation of powers, and the individual liberty that 
is the foundation of many substantive constitutional rights.163  
Professor Nachbar’s analysis finds that in the case of the 
Intellectual Property Clause, such narrowing norms operate 
weakly, if at all.164  Instead, the countervailing constitutional norm 
of favoring legislation by the representative branch of government 
in matters of economic policy is controlling.165  Professor Nachbar 
finds that the values underlying Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 are 
served best through judicial deference to Congress166—the 
approach that the Supreme Court has consistently taken to federal 
copyright legislation.167 
Professor Nachbar’s method recognizes that “a variety of 
values are served by the Section 8 limitations,”168 and offers a 
means to navigate between the poles flagged by Gibbons169 and 
 
 160 Id. at 317. 
 161 Id. (a constitutional norm means a rule “required by and even inherent” in the 
Constitution). 
 162 Id. at 318. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. at 361–62. 
 165 Id. at 318 (“When the regulation is economic in character—as is intellectual property 
legislation—the preference for representative government means that constitutional 
ambiguities affecting Congress’s power are read in Congress’s favor.”). 
 166 Id. at 291 (“There is simply no way to characterize the limits in the Intellectual 
Property Clause as so fundamental to the constitutional order as to warrant their inference 
as a matter of structure . . . . The Intellectual Property Clause’s limits reflect a policy 
choice about the reach of a relatively insignificant form of economic regulation allocating 
quasi-property rights between private entities.”). 
 167 The Supreme Court has never struck down a statute enacted pursuant to the 
Copyright Act except for the first federal Trademark Act which was later revisited in the 
Lanham Act and promulgated under the Commerce Clause. See supra notes 122–25 and 
accompanying text. 
 168 Nachbar, supra note 18, at 317.  Not all Section 8 limits are alike. Compare Gibbons, 
455 U.S. at 462, with Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 250. 
 169 See supra notes 140–46 and accompanying text. 
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Heart of Atlanta Motel.170  According to this analysis, the 
Intellectual Property Clause exerts no control over other 
enumerated powers and Congress’ Commerce Clause authority to 
enact copyright-like laws is unencumbered.171 
D. United States v. Moghadam 
Five years before United States v. Martignon, the 
constitutionality of the anti-bootlegging statute was considered and 
upheld by the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Moghadam.172 
1. Facts and Procedural History 
Ali Moghadam arrived in Orlando, Florida, expecting to visit 
Disney World and to make some business deals.173  Unbeknownst 
to him, the invitation was the climax of a year-long undercover 
operation by the United States Customs Service, dubbed 
“Operation Goldmine.”174  The sting yielded eleven arrests and 
approximately 800,000 compact discs containing bootleg 
recordings of performances by the Grateful Dead, Dave Matthews 
Band, Bruce Springsteen, Phish, Smashing Pumpkins, Tori Amos, 
and the Beastie Boys, amongst others.175 
Ali Moghadam was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 2319A by 
“knowingly distributing, selling, and trafficking in” unauthorized 
compact discs of live concerts.176  On appeal he argued that the 
statute was unconstitutional because it could not be legitimately 
enacted under any of Congress’ enumerated Article I, § 8 
powers.177  The court rejected Moghadam’s constitutional 
 
 170 See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text. 
 171 See Nachbar, supra note 18, at 297 (“There is nothing about the arrangement of 
powers and limitations in the Intellectual Property Clause to suggest that its limitations, 
even its express limitations, reach beyond the Clause itself.  The limitation is on a power, 
which in turn is bounded by the grant.”). 
 172 United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 173 See Paul Farhi, CD Bootleggers Face the Music: Supply of Illegal Recordings 
Shrinks after Customs Crackdown, WASH. POST, July 14, 1997, at A1. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 177 Id. 
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challenge and affirmed his conviction.178  Moghadam’s 
applications for rehearings and for a writ of certiorari were 
denied.179 
2. Summary of the Moghadam Opinion 
The Eleventh Circuit first considered the nature of the anti-
bootlegging statutes,180  and it found that they were best described 
as “quasi-copyright” or sui generis statutes “that in some ways 
resemble the protections of copyright law but in other ways are 
distinct from them.”181  The court noted that the civil statute was 
codified in Title 17 and utilized the remedy for copyright 
infringement, yet seemed to lack the Copyright Act’s requirements 
of limited duration and fixation.182  The court also noted that the 
statutes were less extensive than copyright, conferring only the 
right to prevent the making of unauthorized sound recordings or 
transmissions.183 
The court next considered whether the “quasi-copyright” 
statute was consistent with the Copyright Clause.184  After briefly 
reviewing the historically expanding meaning of the term 
“Writings,” the court declined to decide whether “Writings” could 
be broadened to encompass live performances.185  Instead, the 
court assumed arguendo that the lack of fixation precluded the use 
of the Copyright Clause as a source of congressional authority and 
 
 178 Id. 
 179 Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, reh’g en banc denied, 193 F.3d 525 (11th Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1036 (2000). 
 180 Id. at 1273. 
 181 Id. at 1272. 
 182 Id. at 1273. 
 183 Id.  In contrast the copyright clause provides for six exclusive rights.  Although not 
all of these may apply in any particular work, typically three or more do apply. See 17 
U.S.C. § 106 (2000 & Supp. 2002). 
 184 Id.  The only question raised on appeal was whether the lack of a fixation 
requirement rendered the statute unconstitutional, and thus, the court declined to consider 
whether the absence of a limited duration would render the statute unconstitutional. 
 185 Id. at 1273–74 (citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 
(1884); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (“[W]ritings . . . may be 
interpreted to include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or 
aesthetic labor.”) (citations omitted)). 
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proceeded to uphold the statute based on an alternative source of 
authority: the Commerce Clause.186 
The court pointed out that Congress’ failure to cite the 
Commerce Clause as grounds for § 2319A did not dispose of the 
question of Constitutional authority.187  Then, applying the test 
developed in United States v. Lopez, the court asked “whether a 
rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated activity 
sufficiently affected interstate commerce.”188  Considering the 
commercial subject of the statute,189 its context as implementation 
of an international trade accord administered by the World Trade 
Organization, and the “deleterious economic effect” bootlegging 
has on the recording industry, the court found that § 2319A 
“clearly prohibits conduct that has a substantial effect on both 
commerce between the several states and commerce with foreign 
nations.”190 
Having found that the anti-bootlegging statute meets the Lopez 
test, the court next addressed the more difficult question of 
whether Congress could use its Commerce Clause power “to avoid 
 
 186 Id. at 1280 n.12 (“We assume arguendo, without deciding, that the Commerce 
Clause could not be used to avoid a limitation in the Copyright Clause if the particular 
use of the Commerce Clause (e.g., the anti-bootlegging statute) were fundamentally 
inconsistent with the particular limitation in the Copyright Clause (e.g., the fixation 
requirement).”). 
 187 Id. at 1275 n.10 (“‘[T]he constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not 
depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise,’ Woods v. Cloyd W. 
Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948), and ‘[i]n exercising the power of judicial review,’ 
we look only at ‘the actual powers of the national government,’ Timmer v. Michigan 
Dep’t of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833, 839 (6th Cir. 1997).”) (citations altered). 
 188 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).  In Lopez, the Court held that 
the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to legislate regarding three things: (i) the use 
of channels of interstate commerce; (ii) instrumentalities and persons or things in 
interstate commerce; and (iii) intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce.  The Moghadam court focused on this third category. 
 189 In the absence of legislative findings of an interstate commercial nexus and in the 
absence of a jurisdictional limit, the Moghadam court would have to “determine 
independently whether the statute regulates ‘activities that arise out of or are connected 
with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect[ ] 
interstate commerce.’” Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276 (citing United States v. Olin Corp., 
107 F.3d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted)). 
 190 Id. 
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the limitations that might prevent it from passing the same 
legislation under the Copyright Clause.”191 
After a review of the relevant case law, the Moghadam court 
held that the various grants of legislative authority act 
independently and in the alternative to the other powers.192  In 
support of Ali Moghadam’s position that the Copyright Clause 
limits Congress’ Commerce Clause authority, the court considered 
Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons.193  The Moghadam 
court found that the Court’s decision to restrict the use of the 
commerce power in Gibbons was the result of a direct conflict 
between the statute and the uniformity requirement of the 
Bankruptcy Clause.194  The court found that no such direct conflict 
was present in the case in controversy.195 
Using a “circumscribed analysis,” the court resolved the 
tension between the Heart of Atlanta Motel jurisprudence and 
Gibbons by finding that the Copyright Clause itself is a positive 
grant which “does not imply any negative pregnant that suggests 
that the term ‘Writings’ operates as a ceiling on Congress’ ability 
to legislate pursuant to other grants.”196  The court further found 
that the anti-bootlegging statute furthered the purpose of, and was 
“in no way inconsistent with,” the Copyright Clause.197  Therefore, 
Gibbons could not control and the statute was a legitimate use of 
Congress’ commerce power under the Commerce Clause.198 
 
 191 Id. at 1277. 
 192 Id. (“[E]ach of the powers of Congress is alternative to all of the other powers, and 
what cannot be done under one of them may very well be doable under another.”) 
(discussing Heart of Atlanta, Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 241 (1964)). 
 193 455 U.S. 457 (1982); see supra notes 140–47 and accompanying text. 
 194 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1279. 
 195 Id. at 1279–80. 
 196 See id. at 1279–80 (qualifying that “[t]he Commerce Clause cannot be used by 
Congress to eradicate a limitation placed upon Congressional power in another grant of 
power” but nonetheless stating “that in some circumstances the Commerce Clause can be 
used by Congress to accomplish something that the Copyright Clause might not allow”). 
 197 Id. at 1280. 
 198 Id. 
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II. THE MARTIGNON AND KISS CATALOG DECISIONS 
Five years after the Eleventh Circuit decision in Moghadam, 
United States District Courts in the Second and Ninth Circuits 
revisited the question of the constitutionality of the anti-
bootlegging statutes.199  Despite gestures to distinguish the cases, 
these opinions are directly contrary to the holding of the 
Moghadam court.200  These decisions apply the rationale of 
Gibbons as a bright-line rule. 
A. United States v. Martignon 
1. Facts and Procedural History 
In September 2003, Jean Martignon was arrested by federal 
and state law enforcement agents for selling bootleg recordings on 
the web, in catalogs, and in a shop through his business “Midnight 
Records.”201  On October 27, 2003, Martignon was indicted by a 
federal grand jury for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2319A.202  The 
indictment included no details as to “the artists that Martignon 
allegedly bootlegged, the scope of the bootlegging, or the 
distribution of bootlegged works.”203  On January 15, 2004, the 
defendant moved for dismissal on the grounds that the anti-
bootlegging statute was unconstitutional.204  In the Opinion and 
Order dated September 24, 2004, the motion was granted.205  The 
Attorney General filed a Notice of Appeal in the Second Circuit on 
October 22, 2004 and Oral Arguments were heard on July 12, 
2005.206   
2. United States v. Martignon Summary 
The Martignon opinion moves briskly to the determination 
that, although the anti-bootlegging statute does substantially affect 
 
 199 See infra Parts II.A–B. 
 200 See infra Parts II.A–B. 
 201 See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. at 429. 
 206 See supra note 11. 
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interstate and international commerce, it may only be enacted 
under the Copyright Clause because it is “copyright-like” in 
nature.207  As such, the statute failed both the fixation requirement 
and the limited times requirement of the Copyright Clause and is 
therefore unconstitutional.208 
As an alternate ground for its holding, the Martignon court 
found that “even if Congress may legislate copyright-like statutes 
under other Section 8 powers, the express limit of durations must 
be adhered to because copyright-like protection must have 
boundaries in order to counter-balance the grant of monopoly 
power to the artist.”209  Therefore, the court held that the absence 
of a durational limitation rendered the statute “fundamentally 
inconsistent” with Copyright Clause.210 
The court first inquired into the nature of the anti-bootlegging 
statute and found that it was primarily copyright-like.211  The court 
pointed out that the anti-bootlegging statute was enacted in order to 
comply with TRIPs, which “dealt completely with intellectual 
property,”212 and that the Senate Report on the Uruguay Round 
Agreement Act described the statutes under the general subheading 
“Copyright Provisions.”213 
The court was also swayed by the fact that the civil anti-
bootlegging statute was codified within the Copyright Act itself214 
and that the criminal anti-bootlegging statute was positioned next 
to the criminal infringement statute.215  In addition, it observed that 
the statute refers to the definition of terms provided within the 
Copyright Act and utilizes the phrase “for purposes of commercial 
 
 207 See Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 428–29. 
 208 See id. at 429 (“The anti-bootlegging statute’s failure to impose a durational 
limitation on its regulation is ‘fundamentally inconsistent’ with the Copyright Clause’s 
requirement that copyright-like regulations only persist for ‘Limited Times.’”). 
 209 See id. at 428–29. 
 210 Id. 
 211 See Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 422 (“Based on the anti-bootlegging statute’s 
language, history, and placement, it is clearly a copyright-like regulation.”). 
 212 Id. at 420. 
 213 Id. at 421 (citing the SENATE REPORT ON THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT ACT, S. 
REP. NO. 103-412, at 225 (1994)); see also supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 214 See 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000); see also supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 215 See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000); see also supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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advantage or private financial gain,” which appears in the criminal 
infringement statute.216 
The court finally concluded that the statute is primarily 
copyright-like, based on “a plain reading of the statute [which] 
makes evident that its purpose is synonymous with that of the 
Copyright Clause” and that “it was enacted primarily to cloak 
artists with copyright-like protection.”217 
The Martignon opinion holds what Moghadam assumed 
arguendo: the anti-bootlegging statute cannot satisfy the 
“Writings” requirement of the Copyright Clause because a live 
performance is not fixed.218  The court applied the structural model 
of the relationship between the enumerated powers as articulated 
by the Supreme Court in Gibbons,219 and by William Patry220 with 
mechanical precision: (1) The statute is primarily copyright-like;221 
(2) the Copyright Clause contains the limitations of duration222 and 
fixation;223  (3) the statute is inconsistent with both of these 
limits;224 (4) therefore, Congress may not use the Commerce 
Clause to bypass the Copyright Clause;225 and (5) the statute is 
unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause.226 
The Martignon court’s insistence on classifying the statute 
based on its purpose is now clear.  If the clause may be classified 
as “copyright-like” then it is categorically confined to Congress’ 
 
 216 Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 421 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(e)(1) (2000)) (“[T]he 
terms ‘copy’, ‘fixed’, ‘musical work’,  ‘phonorecord’, ‘reproduce’, ‘sound recordings’, 
and ‘transmit’ mean those terms within the meaning of title 17.”). 
 217 Id. at 420–22 (emphasis added). 
 218 Id. at 423–24. 
 219 Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982); see U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8 (conferring all of Congress’ enumerated powers). 
 220 See Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 425 n.16. See generally Patry, supra note 106. 
 221 See supra notes 212–17 and accompanying text. 
 222 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000) (establishing a 
basic copyright term of life of the author plus 70 years). 
 223 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic, 188 
U.S. 239 (1903). 
 224 See Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 422–24 (Part II.C: “Sustainability of the Anti-
Bootlegging Statute Under the Copyright Clause”). 
 225 See id. at 424–29 (Part II.D: “When Copyright Clause Power Conflicts With 
Commerce Clause Power”). 
 226 Id. 
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copyright authority, and as such, the anti-bootlegging statute may 
not be sustained under alternative authority.227 
The Martignon holding echoes the holding in Gibbons: 
[W]hen Congress enacts copyright or copyright-like 
legislation, for the purpose stated in the Copyright Clause, 
it is constrained by the Copyright Clause’s boundaries.  
Finding otherwise, as cautioned by Ry. Labor Execs.’ 
Ass’n, would grant Congress the ability “to repeal the 
[fixation and durational] requirement[s]” of Art. I, § 8 cl. 8 
of the constitution.228 
Thus, the Martignon court applied Gibbons as a model and 
reached the same result.  Express limits on one of Congress’ 
enumerated powers impliedly limit Congressional discretion to 
legislate under another. 
B. KISS Catalog v. Passport International Productions, Inc. 
Only three months after the Southern District of New York 
entered its Opinion and Order in Martignon, the Central District of 
California entered its Opinion and Order229 in KISS Catalog,230 
reaching a similar result based on the same rationale. 
1. Facts 
On July 10, 1976, KISS231 performed at New Jersey’s 
Roosevelt Stadium as part of its “Spirit of ‘76” tour.232  The 
 
 227 See id. at 426 n.17 (“Congress is not bound by the Copyright Clause’s limitations 
when it legislates in an unrelated field and enacts legislation for a purpose other than the 
one embodied in the Copyright Clause.  However, when Congress enacts copyright or 
copyright-like legislation, for the purpose stated in the Copyright Clause, it is constrained 
by the Copyright Clause’s boundaries.”). 
 228 Id. at 426 (citing Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 468–69). 
 229 The Martignon Order was entered on Sept. 24, 2004 and KISS Catalog on Dec. 21, 
2004. 
 230 Kiss Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
 231 KISS is a New York City-based band that became famous in the mid-1970s and is 
attributed with inventing much of the musical genre “heavy metal.”  The band is known 
for its elaborate stage shows, loud music, and extravagant costumes. See KISS, at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KISS_%28band%29 (last visited Apr. 11, 2005). See 
generally GENE SIMMONS, KISS AND MAKE-UP (2001). 
 232 See KISS Catalog, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 825. 
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concert promoter, Metropolitan Talent, Inc., (Metropolitan) 
arranged for three camera video coverage of the concert for 
simultaneous projection behind the performers.233  The video-feed 
was also recorded onto videotape.234  Thirty years later, in June 
2003, Metropolitan’s agent licensed “the long-forgotten Roosevelt 
Concert footage” to the defendant, Passport International 
Productions, Inc. (Passport).235  Passport began to sell the video, in 
DVD format, in October 2003 as KISS: The Lost Concert.236 
In November 2003, the plaintiffs, Kiss Catalog and founding 
band members/songwriters Gene Klein (a.k.a. Gene Simmons) and 
Paul Stanley, filed a variety of trademark and state law claims.237  
The court issued a preliminary injunction against continued sales 
that was reversed by the Ninth Circuit.238  In August 2004, the 
plaintiffs added a claim of distributing bootleg recordings in 
violation of 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3), which creates a cause of 
action against distributors of bootleg recordings.239  In October 
2004, the plaintiffs added a copyright infringement claim based on 
a statement by Metropolitan’s CEO which averred that the footage 
was a work-for-hire and KISS was the rightful copyright owner.240 
Based on the copyright infringement claim, the court issued a 
preliminary injunction against sales on November 8, 2004.241  On 
December 21, 2004, the court granted the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss the anti-bootlegging claim, finding that 17 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(3) was unconstitutional because it violated the “limited 
Times” requirement of the Copyright Clause.242 
 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id.  As of April 11, 2005, this DVD was still available, among other places, at 
http://www.mvc.co.uk/common/product.jhtml?pid=30049846. 
 237 See KISS Catalog, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 825.  KISS Catalog is the holder of KISS 
trademarks. Id. 
 238 KISS Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 108 Fed. Appx. 525 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 239 See KISS Catalog, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 825. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. at 833 (“Since the Court cannot include a limited term of its own accord, the 
Court holds that the current version of the statute creates perpetual copyright-like 
protection in violation of the ‘for limited Times’ restriction of the Copyright Clause.”). 
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2. Summary of the KISS Catalog Opinion 
The court first noted that although the civil anti-bootlegging 
statute had been in existence for a decade, the issue was a matter of 
first impression for the courts.243 
The court held that § 1101(a)(3) unconstitutionally extends 
perpetual protection against the distribution of bootleg phonograms 
or copies of a performance.244  In the case at bar, the protection 
was invoked for an act of distribution that took place twenty-eight 
years after the original recording had been made.245  The court 
found that the plain language of the statute246 did not establish a 
durational limit, but applied to any distribution of unauthorized 
recordings, regardless of when it was originally fixed.247  The court 
also held that, although § 1101 was codified within title 17, the 
Copyright Act’s own limits on duration did not apply.248  Congress 
had specifically incorporated the remedies found in 17 U.S.C. §§ 
502–05; therefore it was “reasonable to conclude that Congress 
included as much existing copyright law [within § 1101] as it 
intended.”249 
Citing the Martignon analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 2319A, the court 
found the anti-bootlegging statutes to be copyright-like,250 and 
therefore, in violation of the “limited Times” requirement of the 
 
 243 Id. at 828. 
 244 Having found that the civil anti-bootlegging statute is a copyright-like statute the 
court next considered whether it was constitutional under the Copyright Clause. Id. at 
831–32.  Referencing the Moghadam court’s discussion of the scope of the fixation 
requirement, the KISS court, like the Moghadam court five years earlier, stopped short of 
deciding the issue. Id. (citing United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1274, 1274 (11th Cir. 
1999)).  The court found fixation to be a close question because in a § 1101(a)(3) claim 
the bootlegged recording may, itself, satisfy the requirement. Id. at 832. 
 245 See id. at 825 (KISS performed the concert on July 10, 1976, while the defendants 
began selling the video in October 2003). 
 246 17 U.S.C. § 1101(c) (2000) (“This section shall apply to any act or acts that occur on 
or after the date of the enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.”).  The “Lost 
Concert” recording took place in 1976, eighteen years before the anti-bootlegging statutes 
were enacted. KISS Catalog, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 825. 
 247 KISS Catalog, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 832. 
 248 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000)). 
 249 Id. at 833. 
 250 Id. at 830. 
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Copyright Clause.251  As in Moghadam and Martignon before it, 
the court then considered whether the Commerce Clause could 
provide alternative authority for the statute by placing Gibbons in 
the balance with The Trade Mark Cases, Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
and Authors League.252  Like the Martignon court, the KISS 
Catalog court found Gibbons to be on point.253  The Gibbons Court 
had examined a clause, “like the Copyright Clause, that both 
provides a positive grant of power and contains an express 
limit.”254  In the instant case, allowing Congress to invoke the 
Commerce Clause in a situation where the Copyright Clause would 
otherwise be violated would “eradicate from the Constitution a 
limitation on the power of Congress.”255 
III. KISS CATALOG AND MARTIGNON ANALYSIS 
This section analyzes the district courts’ formalist rationale and 
suggests that questions of implied limits on Congress’ legislative 
authority require a functional analysis.  Both courts applied the 
template laid-out in Gibbons categorically, i.e. without alteration 
or adjustment.  This results not only in the wrong conclusion in 
KISS Catalog and Martignon but in a sweeping precedent that 
would be highly debilitating to Congress’ ability to regulate the 
information economy. 
Part A distinguishes Gibbons and finds that the courts failed to 
consider significant differences between the statutes and 
constitutional clauses involved.  Part B distinguishes William 
Patry’s “negative rights” hypothesis from the matter before the 
district courts.  Part C suggests that imposing implied limits upon 
Congress’ legislative authority requires a functional, not a 
categorical approach and advocates for an inquiry that asks 
whether the anti-bootlegging statutes are incongruous with the 
Commerce Clause or interfere with the Copyright Clause.  Parts D 
 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. at 834. 
 253 Id. at 836. 
 254 Id. at 836–37. 
 255 Id. at 836 (citing Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 469 
(1982)). 
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and E inquire whether the anti-bootlegging statutes actually 
conflict with the “Writings”  and “limited Times” requirements of 
the Copyright Clause. 
A. The Quasi-Copyright Nature of the Statutes: Distinguishing 
Gibbons 
Unlike the Eleventh Circuit,256 the Southern District of New 
York and Central District of California find convincing congruence 
between the uniformity requirement in the Bankruptcy Clause and 
the limitations of the Copyright Clause.  The Martignon opinion is 
modeled closely on Railway Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons,257 and 
both district court opinions rely on the case.258  However, the 
district courts did not consider a number of distinguishing points 
between Gibbons and the present case: the absence of a state 
sovereignty interest, the absence of a distinct textual implication of 
external effect, and the circumscribed scope of the statute’s 
protection.  The district courts simply applied Gibbons as a blanket 
rule, an overly broad approach that unnecessarily hinders 
Congress’ ability to legislate within the grant of its enumerated 
powers. 
1. Differences between the Statutes 
The Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance 
Act (RITA) at issue in Gibbons was found by the Court to be an 
actual bankruptcy law, not a bankruptcy-like law: the Act applied 
to an ongoing proceeding in bankruptcy court, reordered the 
priority of creditors’ claims, and required the bankruptcy court to 
implement the final arrangements.259  RITA’s legislative history 
 
 256 See supra Part I.D. 
 257 See supra Part I.D. 
 258 See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating 
that it is “essential to determine how to classify a statute in order to ensure that it does not 
run afoul of any express limitations imposed on Congress when regulating in the 
respective arena”) (citing Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 467); KISS Catalog, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 
823 (“Like the Martignon court, this Court finds [Gibbons] to be the most instructive 
case on this issue.”). 
 259 Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 467–68. 
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also revealed that “Congress wanted to make liquidation of a 
railroad costly for the estate.”260 
In contrast to RITA, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A is, at most, a quasi-
copyright statute.261  The statute affords substantially less 
protection than copyright protection, vesting only the exclusive 
right to record or broadcast a live performance in the 
performers.262  Any other form of copying, including the 
subsequent performance of the identical work by an unauthorized 
performer, or copying of the actual notes performed, is not 
addressed by the statute.263 
The Martignon court does not consider the statute’s minimal 
scope.264  Instead, the court cites evidence of Congress’ intent as 
proof that the statute is primarily copyright-like.265  This evidence 
is ambiguous at best.  The Martignon court’s emphasis on TRIPs’ 
“IP” (Intellectual Property) aspect266 only contrasts with the 
Moghadam court’s focus on its “TR” (Trade-Related) aspect.267  
The confluence of international trade and intellectual property 
 
 260 Id. 
 261 See, e.g., United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 1999) (“The 
rights created by the anti-bootlegging provisions . . . are actually hybrid rights that in 
some ways resemble the protections of copyright law but in other ways are distinct from 
them.”). 
 262 Compare supra notes 178–79 and accompanying text with notes 209–14 and 
accompanying text.  In contrast, copyright prevents any substantial copying and grants 
multiple rights to exclude in 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000 & Supp. 2002). 
 263 Of course, in the case of a performance of contemporary music, the underlying 
musical composition will often be protected by copyright, in which case, transcription of 
the composition and subsequent performance, although permitted by the anti-bootlegging 
statutes, would violate the Copyright Act’s reproduction and public performance rights. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 106.  However, performances of musical compositions that have fallen 
into the public domain, such as of Mozart, or improvisational or other works that have 
not been fixed in a tangible medium of expression, may be transcribed, performed, and 
distributed unhindered by the anti-bootlegging statutes, which only protect against 
simultaneously produced recordings and transmissions. See supra note 8. 
 264 Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 422. 
 265 Id. 
 266 Id. at 420 (stating TRIPs “dealt completely with intellectual property”). 
 267 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276 (“The specific context in which § 2319A was enacted 
involved a treaty with foreign nations, called for by the World Trade Organization, whose 
purpose was to ensure uniform recognition and treatment of intellectual property in 
international commerce.  The context reveals that the focus of Congress was on interstate 
and international commerce.”) (emphasis added). 
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interests only underscores the difficulty of characterizing the 
statute as primarily embodying the values of either the Commerce 
or the Copyright Clauses.  The fact that the Committee on the 
Judiciary divided the TRIPs chapter of the Senate Report into the 
three-part division of copyright, patent, and trademark is also less 
than helpful.268  The protection of live musical performances from 
bootleggers is undoubtedly more similar to a copyright than a 
trademark or a patent.  While it would have been more accurate to 
provide a fourth subheading “Sui Generis Provisions,” the bare 
five-sentence description of both statutes in the report attests to the 
cursory consideration given to its drafting.269 
Both courts’ arguments for a copyright-like status based on 
statutory placement is undermined by Authors League of America, 
Inc. v. Oman,270 in which the Second Circuit held that the 
Manufacturing Clause,271 codified in Section 601 of the Copyright 
Act, was justified not by the Copyright Clause, but by the 
Commerce Clause.272  Had Congress intended live performance to 
become a protected subject matter under the Copyright Act it 
would have amended § 102(a) as it has done repeatedly in the 
past.273  Instead, Congress created a new Chapter 11 to 
accommodate the civil statute.  Similarly, Congress could have 
amended 18 U.S.C. § 2319, the umbrella criminal infringement 
statute for all copyrightable subject matter, to include criminal 
infringement of live performances.  Instead, Congress opted to 
 
 268 See id.; see also supra note 34.  The anti-bootlegging statutes implement Article 14 
of TRIPs which comes under the subheading of “Copyright and Related Rights.” See 
supra note 8. 
 269 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 8E.05[A] (“In the context of Chapter 11 [of 
Title 17], the question arises how Congress viewed its enactment authority.  There is no 
answer.  Chapter 11 itself offers no clue as to how it might pass constitutional muster.  
The legislative history, Statement of Administrative Action, and floor statements are 
similarly bereft of support.”). 
 270 See Authors League of Am., Inc. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1986); see also 
supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text. 
 271 17 U.S.C. § 601 (2000). 
 272 See Authors League, 790 F.2d at 224 (finding that the Manufacturing Clause was 
“clearly justified as an exercise of the legislature’s power to regulate commerce with 
foreign nations”); see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
 273 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (2000).  Architectural works were added as copyrightable 
subject matter in 1990. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 703, 
104 Stat. 5089 (1990). 
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enact a separate statute, distinct from a claim of copyright 
infringement.274  Finally, while it is true that the phrase “for 
purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain” 
appears in both the criminal infringement and anti-bootlegging 
statutes, the phrase also appears in a criminal statute regarding 
“fraud and related activity in connection with computers,” a title 
18 statute that was enacted under Congress’ Commerce Clause 
powers.275  In Moghadam, the court cites the phrase as evidence 
that the statute was, indeed, of and concerning commerce.276 
The Martignon court recites this ambiguous evidence of 
Congressional intent after agreeing with the Moghadam court that 
“Congress’ belief as to the power under which it enacts a statute is 
not dispositive.”277  At most, the court’s rationale illustrates that 
the statute is, as the Moghadam court had found it, a somewhat 
copyright-like statute. 
2. Differences between the Clauses 
Chief Justice Rehnquist observes that the text of the 
Bankruptcy Clause was drafted specifically contemplating statutes 
of the very kind faced by the Court in that case.278  The word 
“uniform” loses much of its meaning if inapplicable to alternative 
sources of legislation.279  The same cannot be said for the text of 
the Copyright Clause.  There is no indication that the terms 
“Writings” and “limited Times” were intended to or must apply to 
any matter beyond the implementation of the grant itself.280 
 
 274 See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000). 
 275 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(b)(2)(B)(i) (2000). 
 276 See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 1999) (“If 
bootlegging is done for financial gain, it necessarily is intertwined with commerce.”). 
 277 United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 419–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also 
Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 307 n.6 (2d ed. 1988) (“The 
question of the constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals 
of the power which it undertakes to exercise.”) (citing Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 
333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948)). 
 278 Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 471 (1982). 
 279 See id. (“Although the debate in the Constitutional Convention regarding the 
Bankruptcy Clause was meager, we think it lends some support to our conclusion that the 
uniformity requirement of the Clause prohibits Congress from enacting bankruptcy laws 
that [in this case] specifically apply to the affairs of only one named debtor.”). 
 280 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
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The Gibbons court emphasized that the Bankruptcy Clause was 
hotly debated during the Constitutional Convention because it 
involved a question of State sovereignty.281  The uniformity 
requirement was, in part, a response to some States’ practice of 
enacting private bills which rendered uniformity impossible.282  
Congressional meddling in particular bankruptcy proceedings is no 
less prone to legislative abuse and may be equally prejudicial to 
the interests of certain States.283 
In contrast, the Copyright Clause was passed by committee 
with little debate, reflecting a weak linkage to State sovereignty 
issues.284  During the centuries following the Constitutional 
Convention, federal copyright law progressively preempted most 
of common-law copyright with little protest from the States.285  
The absence of a strong State sovereignty component286 
undermines the view that the commerce power is restricted in this 
matter.  State sovereignty concerns are further assuaged by § 
1101(d), which preserves all State protection of live performances 
 
 281 Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 472. 
 282 Id. 
 283 See id. 
 284 See Nachbar, supra note 18, at 338 (“There was very little discussion of the 
Intellectual Property Clause among the Framers; there is no record of any debate over it 
at the Federal Convention.”); Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright 
Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEO. L.J. 109, 114 (1929) (“The matter, on its merits, 
apparently aroused substantially no controversy either in the Convention or among the 
States adopting the Constitution.”). 
 285 The Copyright Act of 1790 protected maps, charts and books for a maximum of two 
fourteen-year terms. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.  The 1909 Act doubled 
the term of protection and encompassed “all the writings of an author” from the moment 
of publication, while common law copyright continued to protect all unpublished works. 
See Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 4, 35 Stat. 1076 (repealed 1976).  The Copyright 
Act of 1976 extended the term to life of the author plus fifty years and protected, from the 
moment of creation, all original works of an author fixed in tangible medium of 
expression under seven broad categories of subject matter. See Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 
Stat. 2827 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302(a) (1998)). 
 286 See Thomas B. Nachbar, Judicial Review and the Quest to Keep Copyright Pure, 2 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 33, 59 (2003) (stating that the “exercise of the copyright 
power does not in any way impinge on the authority of the States.”). But see NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 52, § 8E.01[B] (“The federalization of control over unfixed 
productions departs from several centuries of American jurisprudence, given that 
regulation of activities lacking fixation has traditionally been the realm of state law 
protection.  In th[is] sense, . . . chapter [11] represents a . . . departure from Constitutional 
moorings . . . .”). 
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from preemption.287  The few Commerce Clause statutes that have 
been struck down by the Court since the Lochner era have each 
touched upon areas of traditional State control, such as 
education288 and health and safety.289  In such cases, the Court has 
applied a heightened form of rational basis review in order to 
safeguard the States from federal overreaching.  Since federalism 
is not strongly implicated in copyright issues, this form of close 
scrutiny should not apply.290  Also, copyright is a field rife with 
economic policy, well-suited to the processes of representative 
government and ill-suited to the processes of the courtroom.291  
Therefore, deference is due to Congressional decision-making and 
the courts should apply a “minimal rational basis” of review.292 
In sum, the absence of a strong state sovereignty interest, the 
absence of a textual implication of external effect, and the 
circumscribed scope of the statutes’ effect sufficiently distinguish 
Gibbons from the present case so as to warrant a reasoned analysis 
not a categorical application of its result. 
B. Distinguishing William Patry’s Structural Analysis 
The Martignon court also misapplies William Patry’s structural 
analysis, which contemplates only the originality requirement.293  
Interpreting Bonito Boats, Feist, and Gibbons, William Patry 
predicted that if Congress tried to protect databases of unoriginal 
facts, the Court would strike it down as an end run around the 
 
 287 17 U.S.C. § 1101(d) (2000). 
 288 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see supra notes 133–34 and 
accompanying text. 
 289 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); see supra note 135 and accompanying 
text. 
 290 See Nachbar, supra note 286, at 59 (“While vigilant judicial review in the federalism 
context is a response to the possibility that Congress has taken power from the States, 
thereby altering the balance of power so carefully established by the Constitution, the 
exercise of the copyright power presents no similarly fundamental danger to the 
constitutional order because exercise of the copyright power does not in any way impinge 
on the authority of the States.”). 
 291 Id. at 34. 
 292 Id. at 68–70 (“[T]he Court applies the lower conceivable basis standard when it is 
satisfied that the sovereign in question does indeed have plenary power in the area being 
regulated.”). 
 293 United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 425 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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Copyright Clause.294  The Martignon court’s extension of this 
reasoning to the “fixation requirement” is unsound.295  Patry 
concluded that in Feist, the Court demarcated the boundary 
between the Copyright Clause and other enumerated powers, and 
that this boundary-line is the originality requirement: the locus of 
the “negative right”/“positive right” divide .296 
This structural analysis, focusing on the originality 
requirement, supports the validity of the federal anti-bootlegging 
statute.  Live musical performances are original works.  Every 
performance is a new experience for audience and performer.  The 
protection extended by the anti-bootlegging statutes does not 
remove the building blocks of creativity from the public domain.  
To the contrary, each performance disseminates the ideas and facts 
embodied in the work and the statute places no restraint on the re-
use of those building blocks.  Indeed, the statute places no restraint 
on the verbatim copying of the live performance.297  The statute 
simply grants the performers the sole right to record or transmit the 
performance.298  This circumscribed protection furthers the goal of 
the Copyright Clause by encouraging the production of new ideas 
and discoveries which are, in turn, given over to the public without 
encumbrance.  The protection of live musical performances by the 
enactment of anti-bootlegging statutes, therefore, is supported by 
William Patry’s structural analysis.299 
C. Implied Limits Require a Functional Rather than a Categorical 
Approach 
After placing the statute in the “copyright” box, both the 
Martignon and the KISS Catalog courts simply conclude that the 
 
 294 See Patry, supra note 106, at 398. 
 295 See Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413. 
 296 See Patry, supra note 106, at 384 (“In Feist, the Court made clear that originality is 
the dividing line of Congress’s enumerated power.”). 
 297 See 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (2000). 
 298 See 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a) (2000). 
 299 If the absence of a fixed form triggers any concern at all it is regarding the scope of 
the dissemination.  Unless it is broadcast, live performance is accessible to only a limited 
number of persons.  However, that concern is ameliorated by the rather circumscribed 
scope of the protection.  The performance may be mimicked and otherwise copied after 
the performance without violating the statute. See infra note 323. 
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Commerce Clause may not authorize the statute.  This is a 
categorical approach to a matter of public policy in which 
deference to Congress is appropriate.  In analogous circumstances, 
the Court has tended to utilize a functional and structural approach 
that weighs the actual effect of potential conflicts between 
Constitutional grants of authority. 
In considering the non-delegation doctrine, the Rehnquist 
Court has taken a functional/structural approach—asking whether 
the delegation at issue is incongruous and whether it actually 
interferes with the functioning of the neighboring power.  For 
example, in Morrison v Olson300 the Supreme Court upheld the 
limited role of the executive in appointing and removing the 
Independent Counsel based on a pragmatic analysis that diverged 
from formalist precedent.301  In Morrison, Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
speaking for the Court, found that Congress’ delegation of the 
power to appoint the Independent Counsel to the courts was not 
incongruent with functions normally performed by courts and 
therefore did not run afoul of Constitutional limits on inter-branch 
appointments.302  Regarding the imposition of a “good cause” 
provision for removal by the executive, the Court stated that the 
real question is whether the President’s ability to perform his duty 
is impeded.303  Finding that the “good cause” provision did not 
“unduly trammel[] on executive authority”304 and did not “pose a 
dange[r] of Congressional usurpation” of executive power,305 the 
Court upheld the delegation.306 
The enumerated powers issue posed by 18 U.S.C. § 2319A and 
17 U.S.C. § 1101 parallels the inter-branch delegation cases, and, 
as in the delegation cases, the inquiry should be a pragmatic one.  
Is the statute incongruous with the commerce power?  Does the 
 
 300 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 301 Id. at 689–90. 
 302 Id. at 677. 
 303 Id. at 691 (“But the real question is whether the removal restrictions are of such a 
nature that they impede the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty, and the 
functions of the officials in question must be analyzed in that light.”). 
 304 Id. 
 305 Id. at 694 (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 714, 727 
(1983)). 
 306 Id. at 691–92. 
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statute actually interfere with the copyright power?  This is 
essentially the approach taken, albeit with spare analysis, by the 
Moghadam court. 
If the finding that the anti-bootlegging statute is “copyright-
like” is accepted, then the question parallels one of delegation 
between constitutional powers.  In Morrison, the transfer of 
authority took place between the Articles of the Constitution.307  In 
Martignon, the transfer of authority occurs between Clauses within 
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution.308  The portion of a quasi-
copyright statute that is “copyright-like” must not pose a danger of 
undermining the place of the Copyright Clause in the 
Constitutional scheme and “may not . . . set at naught” the benefits 
contemplated by the Clause.309  This is a matter of hybrid 
authority.  Power sharing between Article I, Section 8 clauses 
should receive more solicitude upon judicial review than power 
sharing between branches of government that involves inter-
Article delegations of authority because there is no equivalent to 
the Necessary and Proper clause on the inter-branch level.310  Also, 
the Court makes clear in Bonito Boats that Congress is vested with 
great discretion to shape the contours of the rights generated by the 
Intellectual Property Clause.311  The balance is Congress’ to 
strike.312  This is amply illustrated in the afterward to Bonito Boats 
in which Congress responded to the Court’s decision by extending 
 
 307 The Independent Counsel is an executive officer; executive officers are typically 
appointed and removed by the President pursuant to his Article I powers. Id. at 657–60.  
Congress, authorized by its Article II powers, delegated the authority to appoint the 
Independent Counsel to the Special Division of the D.C. Circuit Court, an Article III 
court. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591 (1978).  The Act also 
restricted removal by the President by requiring a showing of “good cause.” See id. 
 308 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 309 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (quoting Sola Elec. Co. 
v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942)). 
 310 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“To make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by 
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof.”). 
 311 See generally Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thundercraft, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989). 
 312 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003) (“Bonito Boats reiterated the 
Court’s unclouded understanding: ‘It is for Congress to determine if the present system’ 
effectuates the goals of the Copyright and Patent Clause.’”) (citing Bonito Boats, 489 
U.S. at 168). 
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sui generis copyright-like protection to vessel hull designs within 
Title V of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act313 and codified in 
a new chapter 13 of the Copyright Act itself. 
In sum, the district courts’ rationale is flawed because it applies 
the result of the Court’s analysis in Gibbons and the result of 
William Patry’s analysis as a bright-line and blanket rule.  
Invalidation of a duly enacted federal law based on an implied 
limit on Congress’ powers should be premised on a finding of 
actual interference with the copyright power or with a larger 
“constitutional norm.”  In the instant case, the structural concerns 
addressed in Feist and Gibbons are not present and, as we shall 
discuss in greater detail below, there is no actual conflict between 
the anti-bootlegging statutes and the Copyright Clause.  Therefore, 
the Circuit Courts should reverse the district courts and find that 
the statute is a legitimate use of Congress’ commerce power. 
D. No Fixation.  No Problem. 
The government314 and amicus briefs315 to the Second Circuit 
rely on the assumption that unfixed works are inherently 
inconsistent with the Copyright Clause “Writings” requirement.  
These briefs argue that unfixed works, such as live performances, 
are simply beyond the subject matter of copyright and therefore no 
conflict arises with Commerce Clause authority.316  This is the 
mirror image of the Martignon opinion.  Both the district court and 
the government would constitutionalize “fixation” as a bright-line 
rule.  Judge Baer would limit the scope of copyright’s protections 
to fixed works, leaving Congress with no authority to regulate 
unfixed works under the Commerce Clause.  In contrast, the 
government would limit the scope of copyright’s restrictions to 
fixed works, giving Congress plenary authority to regulate unfixed 
works under the Commerce Clause.317  Both approaches would 
effect an artificial bifurcation of the federal copyright power, a 
 
 313 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
 314 See Martignon Brief for the U.S., supra note 27, at 16. 
 315 UMG Amicus Brief, supra note 27, at 13; Ass’n of Am. Publishers Amicus Brief, 
supra note 27, at 21. 
 316 See, e.g., Martignon Brief for the U.S., supra note 27, at 16. 
 317 See id. 
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result that is legislatively inefficient and harmful to the 
Constitutional scheme.  Also, “fixation” is an increasingly murky 
and metaphysical concept as information is manipulated at near 
real-time through processes no more fixed than a quantum 
probability or a phosphorescent glow.  As a result, it can provide 
only an arbitrary basis for delimiting where the copyright power 
begins and ends.  Ironically, the insistence on permanence may 
itself place the foundations of copyright on shifting sands. 
A sounder basis of decision would inquire whether the 
regulation undermines the constitutional floor erected in Feist 
Publications v. Rural Telephone Service.318  Technological 
innovation is unlikely to erode the principles of originality or the 
fact/expression and idea/expression dichotomy, as it has begun to 
erode the concept of the fixation.  The “Progress of Science and 
the useful Arts” is promoted when new forms of expression, 
including those that challenge the traditional meaning of 
“Writings,” are brought within copyright’s protective mantle.319  
Therefore, determining the scope of protection by asking whether a 
statute functionally conflicts with the Copyright Clause would 
preserve meaningful distinctions between Clauses 3 and 8, and, at 
the same time, provide Congress with the flexibility it requires. 
1. Live Performances May Be “Writing[s]” 
A live musical performance may, in fact, be a “Writing;” 
therefore it is unfortunate that the Martignon prosecutors conceded 
that they are not.320  In Moghadam, the Eleventh Circuit noted that 
it is unclear whether “Writings” may be expanded to include live 
performances which “are merely capable of fixation” and decided 
the case on other grounds.321  The KISS Catalog court also decided 
the case on grounds other than the “Writings” requirement, finding 
it a “closer question” than the “limited Times” requirement.322  
While common law copyright has recognized copyright 
 
 318 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 319 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 320 See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 423–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 321 See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 322 KISS Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 832 (C.D. Cal. 
2004). 
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infringement of unfixed expressions323 and California has codified 
its protection of unfixed works,324 the federal copyright system has 
always implicitly or explicitly required that the work be fixed in a 
“tangible medium of expression.”325  However, despite 
protestations by venerable commentators that construing 
“Writings” to include performances is ludicrous,326 the Court has 
not limited Congress’ discretion in this matter and requires no 
more from a “Writing” than an original expression that is made by 
an “Author.”327 
The Framers lived in a world dominated by the quill and the 
printing press.  Even these prescient drafters could not have 
envisioned camcorders, DATs, eyeglass-cams, mini-mics, and a 
battery of other miniaturized and affordable means of surreptitious 
reproduction, in simulacra, of a live work.  Neither would the 
progenitors of American copyright protection have conceived of a 
network of peer-to-peer and file transfer protocols in which clones 
 
 323 See, e.g., Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 349 (1968) 
(“Assuming, without deciding, that in a proper case a common-law copyright in certain 
limited kinds of spoken dialogue might be recognized, it would, at the very least, be 
required that the speaker indicate that he intended to mark off the utterance in question 
from the ordinary stream of speech, that he meant to adopt it as a unique statement and 
that he wished to exercise control over its publication.”); see also Falwell v. Penthouse 
Int’l, 521 F. Supp. 1204 (W.D. Va. 1981) (finding oral interview does not come within 
narrow circumstances that can sustain a common law copyright cause of action). 
 324 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 980(a)(1) (1982). 
The author of any original work of authorship that is not fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression has an exclusive ownership in the representation or 
expression thereof as against all persons except one who originally and 
independently creates the same or similar work.  A work shall be considered 
not fixed when it is not embodied in a tangible medium of expression or when 
its embodiment in a tangible medium of expression is not sufficiently 
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration, either directly or 
with the aid of a machine or device. 
Id. 
 325 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666 
(“Two essential elements––original work and tangible object––must merge through 
fixation in order to produce subject matter copyrightable under the statute.”). 
 326 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 1.08[C][2] (“If the word ‘writings’ is to be 
given any meaning whatsoever, it must, at the very least, denote some material form, 
capable of identification and having a more or less permanent endurance.”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 327 See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). 
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of such recorded works are exported globally in a matter of 
minutes. 
It is entirely plausible that the living document of the U.S. 
Constitution does not exclude protection of certain live works 
within the broad grant of discretion the Copyright Clause vests in 
Congress.  In this scenario, the Copyright Act’s fixation 
requirement functions as an evidentiary and administrative 
measure applicable to the bulk of protected subject matter, and sui 
generis protection of original but unfixed works, while outside the 
Copyright Act itself, is within the scope of the copyright power.328 
As noted by the Moghadam court, Congress’ protection of live 
broadcasts through the legal fiction329 of simultaneous recording 
illustrates that the fixation requirement is a flexible standard; 
therefore, 18 U.S.C. § 2319A is more in the nature of “an 
incremental change than a constitutional breakthrough.”330  
Recognizing that the Copyright Clause is broader than the 
Copyright Act, the courts should not force Congress to legislate by 
legal fiction, but should recognize that the Constitution’s interest in 
the progress of the useful arts is promoted when live performances 
are protected. 
2. Protecting Live Performances Does Not Conflict with the 
Copyright Clause 
Even if the term “Writings” is construed as excluding live 
musical performances, there is no inherent conflict between the 
protection of fixed works under the Copyright Clause and sui 
generis protection of live performances under the Commerce 
Clause.  Such protections provide incentives to performing artists 
to produce live works that disseminate the ideas and facts 
 
 328 See CBS v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 320 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1007 
(1967) (“[W]hile more precise limitations on ‘writings’ might be convenient in 
connection with a statutory scheme of registration and notice, we see no reason why 
Congress’ power is so limited.”). 
 329 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are 
being transmitted, is ‘fixed’ for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being 
made simultaneously with its transmission.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666. 
 330 United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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embodied within to their audience.  While fixation enlarges the 
scope of dissemination, in both time and space, it does not change 
the “essential” benefit gained by the public.  Therefore the anti-
bootlegging statutes are consistent with the goals of copyright as 
delineated in Feist and do not undermine the Congressional 
scheme enacted to give effect to the Copyright Clause. 
3. “Proto-Copyright” Protection 
Protection of original works that are poised to be fixed is a 
distinct species of quasi-copyright that this Comment shall label 
“proto-copyright.”331  Proto-copyright statutes protect live, 
streaming, transmitted, and RAM-cached works that are the 
unfixed precursors to wholly copyrightable expressions.332  Proto-
copyright protection promotes the progress of science and the 
useful arts by encouraging performances that in turn may be fixed 
in a copyrightable form to be determined by the author(s).  Where 
a proto-copyright protection guards, as it does in the instant case, 
only against reproduction of a work by means of a recording, and 
only for the duration of a performance, such protection is 
consistent with the Copyright Clause because it does not create an 
ongoing monopoly interest in a particular work.333  Quasi-
copyright is a broader genus of protection encompassing both 
proto-copyright and copyright-like protection of works that would 
not be protectable under the Copyright Clause itself if fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression.  Protection of unoriginal databases 
is one such proposed quasi-copyright statute and is distinct from 
the proto-copyright statute at issue in the instant case.334  Thus, the 
 
 331 See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000) 
(defining proto as “1. First in time, earliest . . . 2. First formed; primitive . . . .”), available 
at http://www.bartleby.com/61/62/P0616200.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). 
 332 The legal fiction protecting live transmissions that are simultaneously recorded is 
another example of proto-copyright protection. See supra note 336. 
 333 See infra notes 336–63 and accompanying text. 
 334 See Alan J. Hartnick, Do Proposed Database Laws Protect Information Rather than 
Investment?, 14(2) N.Y. ST. B.A. ENT., ARTS & SPORTS L.J. 61 (2003) (“If there is a new 
law, to avoid controversy, it will need to be narrowly drafted.”); see also Patry, supra 
note 106. Contra Nachbar, supra note 18, at 274. 
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anti-bootlegging statutes are not unconstitutional simply because 
they are not yet “fixed in a tangible medium of expression.”335 
E. The Statutes Do Not Conflict with the “limited Times” 
Requirement 
The Martignon decision’s alternative ground—that even if 
Congress may enact copyright-like statutes under the Commerce 
Clause, the anti-bootlegging statute is ‘fundamentally inconsistent’ 
with the Copyright Clause because it lacks a durational limit—
rests on the false premise that “limited Times” for purposes of 
copyright and patent protection is equivalent.  Drawing upon 
precedents from patent law, the court ignores the Court’s lesson in 
Eldred v. Ashcroft336 that “limited Times” operates differently in 
copyright than patent law because 1) copyright is not a true 
monopoly and 2) public disclosure is a goal but not a requirement 
of copyright.  The result of this confusion is an expansive and 
overly rigid version of the “limited Times” requirement as applied 
to copyright generally and to a proto-copyright statute, such as the 
anti-bootlegging statutes, particularly.337  Because “limited Times” 
acts as an antidote to monopoly, where such concerns are absent 
the requirement should by not be applied.  However, the anti-
bootlegging statutes at issue do not violate even the expansive 
version of the “limited Times” requirement espoused by the district 
courts because live performances are of intrinsically finite 
duration. 
 
 335 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000 & Supp. 2002). 
 336 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 337 Although the Court has, in certain cases, analogized to patent law, recognizing “the 
historic kinship between patent law and copyright law,” it has also emphasized that “[t]he 
two areas of the law, naturally, are not identical twins, and we exercise the caution which 
we have expressed in the past in applying doctrine formulated in one area to the other.” 
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19.  In Eldred, 
the Court squarely states that durational limits is one area where fruitful analogies 
between patent and copyright may not be drawn. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 217. 
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1. The “limited Times” Requirement Applies Differently to 
Patents and Copyrights 
The Martignon court provides only a brief explanation for its 
conclusion that the lack of a durational limitation is fundamentally 
inconsistent with the Copyright Clause.  Citing P.C. Films Corp. v. 
Turner Entertainment Co.,338 the court stated that “[t]he ‘Limited 
Times’ requirement offsets [an author’s] monopoly and ensures 
that the public will benefit, albeit at a later date, when the work 
reaches the public domain.”339 
This rationale is based on false premises stemming from a 
confusion of patent and copyright.  This confusion is borne out by 
the passage in P.C. Films referenced by the court: “The public has 
invested in such free use by the grant of a monopoly to the 
patentee for a limited time.  Hence any attempted reservation or 
continuation . . . of the patent monopoly, after the patent 
expires . . . runs counter to the policy and purpose of the patent 
laws.”340  For this passage, P.C. Films references the Court’s 
decisions in Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Manufacturing Co.341 and 
Brulotte v. Thys Company,342 both of which decided questions of 
patent law.343 
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court stated that the copyright and 
patent systems effectuate the Intellectual Property Clause in 
distinct ways and courts should be wary of applying the analysis of 
patents cases to copyright cases, especially when analyzing 
questions of duration.344  The reason for this caution is two-fold: 1) 
copyright is not a true monopoly and 2) disclosure is not required 
by copyright, but is the quid pro quo of patent protection. 
 
 338 P.C. Films Corp. v. Turner Entm’t Co., 954 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (deciding 
the effect of a copyright renewal upon a perpetual license under the 1909 Act). 
 339 United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing P.C. 
Films Corp., 954 F. Supp. at 715 (citations omitted)). 
 340 P.C. Films Corp, 954 F. Supp. at 715. 
 341 Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945). 
 342 Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964), reh’g denied, 79 U.S. 985 (1965). 
 343 P.C. Films, 954 F. Supp. at 715. 
 344 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003) (“[P]atents and copyrights do not 
entail the same exchange, and . . . our references to a quid pro quo typically appear in the 
patent context.”). 
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a) Copyright Is Not a True Monopoly 
As noted by Justice Ginsberg, speaking for the Court, in 
Eldred: 
Distinguishing the two kinds of intellectual property, 
copyright gives the holder no monopoly on any knowledge.  
A reader of an author’s writing may make full use of any 
fact or idea she acquires from her reading. . . . The grant of 
a patent, on the other hand, does prevent full use by others 
of the inventor’s knowledge.345 
Copyright only grants protection to a particular expression.346  
This protection also falls short of being a true monopoly because, 
unlike patent, copyright does not require novelty:347 in copyright, 
an independently created work that is identical to a pre-existing 
work, does not infringe that pre-existing identical work.348  
Therefore, while the “limited Times” requirement offsets the 
patent monopoly, it does not function in the same way in the 
copyright context. 
b) Disclosure is Not Required by Copyright, but Is the 
Quid Pro Quo of Patent Protection 
Since the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, publication 
is no longer a prerequisite of copyright protection.349  This 
underscores a basic distinction between copyright and patent.  
While a patent acts very much like a contract, with consideration 
on both sides of the bargain, copyright acts more as an incentives 
scheme that does not require disclosure as quid pro quo.  Justice 
Ginsberg highlights this distinction in Eldred: 
 
 345 See id. at 217. 
 346 See generally SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 64, § 16.1. 
 347 Id. 
 348 See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures, 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (“Borrowed 
the work must not indeed be . . . ; but if by some magic a man who had never known it 
were to compose anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an ‘author,’ and, if he 
copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy 
Keats’s [since Keats’s work is now in the public domain].”) 
 349 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, § 301, at 129 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5745. 
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[I]mmediate disclosure is not the objective of, but is 
exacted from, the patentee.  It is the price paid for the 
exclusivity secured . . . . For the author seeking copyright 
protection, in contrast, disclosure is the desired objective, 
not something exacted from the author in exchange for the 
copyright.350 
The Court’s statement that  “limited Times” requires a different 
analysis in patent than in copyright applies with even more force in 
the case of proto-copyright statutes, such as 17 U.S.C. § 1101 and 
18 U.S.C. § 2319A, which provide for only minimal copyright-like 
protections.351 
c) “limited Times” is Required Only as an Antidote to 
Monopoly 
In Feist and Bonito Boats, the Court raised the concern that, in 
promoting the progress of science and the arts, Congress should 
not lock-up the “building blocks” of creativity, as this would 
undermine that goal.352  With patents, the law permits knowledge 
to be monopolized for a limited time on the condition that it is 
fully disclosed in executable detail to the public.353  This “quid pro 
quo” acts as a sort of “idea pump” permitting 20 years of 
monopoly profits to come in, in return for subsequent free access 
by the public forever. 
In copyright, the scheme less resembles a contract with full 
consideration on either side than it does an incentives scheme.  
This is because ideas cannot be protected under copyright and to 
the extent that an expression is an idea, it may be utilized under the 
 
 350 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 216. 
 351 The anti-bootlegging statutes protect only against unauthorized recordings and 
transmissions, and only during the course of a live musical event.  In contrast, copyright 
protects the copyright holder from any form of copying for the entire term of protection, 
as well as against subsequent performances, and adaptations. See supra note 8.  Similarly, 
there is no equivalent to the Copyright Act’s broad distribution right in the anti-
bootlegging statute. See infra notes 362–63 and accompanying text. 
 352 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thundercraft, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989); see also Feist 
Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991). 
 353 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 224. 
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“fair use” exception.354  Thus, the moment a copyrightable subject 
is published the idea(s) and facts embedded within the expression 
flow freely to the public.355  As articulated in Feist, this is the 
primary benefit and the “essence of copyright.”356  This benefit is 
achieved through the ex-ante economic encouragement of the 
author to produce and publish the work.357  This primary benefit, 
of entry of fact and idea into the public domain, accrues 
immediately upon publication. 
A secondary public benefit of copyright, not addressed in Feist, 
is economic and affects the scope of the dissemination.  When a 
copyright term expires and a work enters the public domain, the 
author’s partial monopoly premium ends and less expensive copies 
may be published by competitors.  However, in a mass market, the 
profit-maximizing prices for copyrighted works during the term of 
protection will often not significantly exceed those of public 
domain works.  As a result, the democratic implications of 
copyright are not distressing.  Therefore, the Intellectual Property 
Clause “limited Times” requirement is less “essential” with respect 
to copyrights than to patents, in which it operates as a quid pro 
quo.  The role of the “limited Times” requirement is further 
attenuated in the case of a proto-copyright protection, such as the 
anti-bootlegging statutes, in which monopoly plays virtually no 
part.358 
2. The Anti-Bootlegging Statutes Meet the “limited Times” 
Requirement 
The anti-bootlegging statutes are consistent with the Copyright 
Clause requirement that protections be granted only for “limited 
Times”359 because a live performance is inherently limited in 
duration.  The statutes vest performers with a right to exclude 
 
 354 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 350; 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 355 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 350. 
 356 Id. at 349 (citing Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 589 
(1985)). 
 357 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558. 
 358 See supra note 351. 
 359 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000) (establishing a 
basic term of life of the author plus 70 years). 
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others from recording or transmitting their performance for the 
duration of the performance.360  When the lights fade-out and the 
curtains fall, the show is over.  As it is the performance itself that 
is the subject matter of protection, not the bootleg recording, it is 
difficult to see how the statute fails the “limited Times” 
requirement.361 
Unlike the copyright distribution right,362 17 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(3) and 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a)(3) (“Section (a)(3)”) restricts 
the distribution of a work that no longer exists.  Therefore, that 
section does not grant an exclusive right of distribution of a work 
at all.  The bootleg recording is the fruit of the initial illegal act of 
making the unauthorized recording and therefore subject to 
injunction.  Since no perpetual right of distribution is secured for 
the performer of the live and inherently finite work, the statutes do 
not violate the “limited Times” requirement of the Copyright 
Clause. 
This distinction is clarified by an example.  In the hypothetical 
case where a simultaneous recording has been made by both the 
bootlegger and the performing artist, then there would be actual 
interference with the artist’s distribution of her work.  In this case, 
Section (a)(3) would act as a form of quasi-distribution right that 
would parallel the author’s right to distribute her sound recording 
of the event, insofar as Section (a)(3) would eliminate competition 
with the distribution of the authorized sound recording.  However, 
because the authorized sound recording is within the Copyright 
Act, it would be subject to the durational limits of 17 U.S.C. § 
302.363  When that copyright expired and the authorized sound 
recording entered the public domain, the Section (a)(3) right would 
lose its effect as a quasi-distribution right, since it would no longer 
protect the author’s distribution interest.  The distribution of the 
unauthorized recording would, once again, be merely the fruit of 
an illegal act and subject to injunction for that reason. 
 
 360 See supra note 8. 
 361 See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000); 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000). 
 362 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2000 & Supp. 2002) (providing the copyright owner the 
right to control the transfer of physical copies of the work). 
 363 See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). 
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The anti-bootlegging statutes also protect a general interest in 
choosing which of a series of performances, if any, to record and 
market.  This protection has no equivalent under the Copyright Act 
which only protects transfers of actual copies or phonograms.  The 
protection more closely resembles a protection of the right of 
privacy as it is construed in the “right of publicity” tort.  Although 
such interests are present to some degree in all of copyright, they 
are pervasive in a live performance, which has not yet been fixed.  
The decision whether to make a recording is a threshold decision 
that marks the transition between personal and public, ephemeral 
and permanent.  That threshold is delineated by the limits of the 
Copyright Act itself.  Protection of performers from a forced entry 
of their work into a form that will persist in time and be widely 
disseminated is consistent with fundamental notions of autonomy, 
privacy and the right not to speak.  Control over how the recording 
is to be made similarly implicates these concerns as evinced by 
Congress’ decision to make sound recordings a copyrightable 
subject matter that is distinct from the underlying musical work.  A 
sound recording, made without authority or control by the artist is, 
therefore, a misrepresentative misappropriation that is distinct from 
the distribution of actual copies contemplated by § 106(3). 
That the live work may not persist except for the bootleg 
recording raises concerns regarding a conflict with the promotion 
of the progress of science and the useful arts.  Statutory authority 
to destroy the only record of a live work364 is also statutory 
authority to remove, in perpetuity, the “building blocks” contained 
in the performance.  This, however, is the very balance that 
Congress is charged by the Constitution with making.  Here, 
Congress has granted performers the right to say which, if any, 
performances are to persist in time as a record of their own 
performance.  This grant encourages live performance and 
dissemination of the ideas and facts contained within them.  
Performing artists, such as the Grateful Dead, Dave Matthews 
Band, and Phish, who choose to freely license the right to record 
their performances to all attending, are free to do so.  Other artists, 
who prefer to determine which of their performances to fix in a 
 
 364 See 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(3)(b) (2000); 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000). 
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tangible medium of expression, and thereby enter the copyright 
system, are protected in making that choice. 
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CONCLUSION: THE ANTI-BOOTLEGGING STATUTES ARE 
CONSTITUTIONAL365 
The Martignon and KISS Catalog decisions mandate that any 
statute protecting live performances must comply with an 
expansive version of copyright’s “limited Times” and “Writings” 
 
 365 The statutes do not directly interfere with the Copyright Clause.  However, they are 
in tension with the Copyright Act in certain circumstances. 
In the case where there is a copyright in the underlying musical composition, if the court 
determines that the bootleg sound recording is a “fair use” under § 107 of the Copyright 
Act, then the statute would seem to conflict with the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 
(2004).  The anti-bootlegging statute would require forfeiture, destruction of the 
phonorecords, and damages or imprisonment of the bootlegger, while the Copyright Act, 
pursuant to the goals of the Copyright Clause, would permit free use. 
Similarly, in the case where there is no copyright in the underlying work (for instance, in 
the case of an improvisation or performances of works in the public domain, such as 
Mozart), the bootlegger may claim a legitimate copyright in the bootleg sound recording 
itself and the statute would again seem to conflict with the Copyright Act. 
These tensions are not constitutionally fatal.  Copyright holders are subject to certain 
limits which are, in turn, subject to First Amendment balancing upon review.  For 
example, federal regulation of indecency and obscenity limit a copyright holder’s ability 
to make use of her exclusive right to distribute, display or perform a copyrighted work. 
See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), reh’g denied, 439 U.S. 883 
(1978); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).  Similarly, a copyright holder may be 
held liable or penalized for publishing unlawfully obtained information, information that 
endangers individual safety, or information that endangers national security. See, e.g., 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (unlawfully obtained information); 
Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (individual safety); United 
States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (national security). But 
see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (permitting publication 
of unlawfully obtained information).  Each of these restrictions is in tension with the 
copyright interest in dissemination of facts and ideas to the public.  However, 
enforcement of such statutes is subject to ad hoc First Amendment balancing of private 
and public interests, not to any test arising out of the Copyright Clause itself. 
Although there is no fatal conflict between the Copyright Clause and the anti-bootlegging 
statutes, a statutory amendment specifying that 17 U.S.C. § 1101 and 18 U.S.C. § 2319A 
only apply to works originally recorded or transmitted after the statutes’ enactment in 
1994 would increase clarity and decrease potential unfairness.  Also, an amendment 
admitting the “fair use” exception would be preferable to ad hoc First Amendment review 
of the statute as applied.  Such an amendment might read: 
This act shall apply only to recordings and transmissions, as set forth in 
subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) respectively, taking place on or after the date of 
the enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act and to subsequent copies 
of the same.  The limitation to exclusive rights set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 107 
shall apply to this section, although any consideration of fair use shall consider 
the intention expressed herein to protect the interests of performers. 
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requirements.  The district courts’ categorical application of 
Gibbons unnecessarily hampers Congress’ ability to shape policy 
and to respond to the demands of domestic and international trade.  
A functional analysis, such as has been applied by the Supreme 
Court in questions of separation of powers, reveals that the anti-
bootlegging statute does not undermine the copyright power and is 
not incongruous with the commerce power.  Therefore the statute 
should be found to be constitutional as drafted and authorized 
under either, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, or Clause 8 itself. 
 
